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Abstract
We embed a competitive search model of the real estate market into a heterogeneous agent
setting where households face credit constraints and idiosyncratic turnover shocks. Households
can accumulate a risk-free asset to build a down payment and to smooth non-housing con-
sumption. There is an inelastic supply of identical homes. The model is “block recursive”. In
equilibrium wealthier home buyers sort into submarkets with higher prices and shorter buying
times. We identify a novel amplification mechanism, arising from sorting, by which demand
shocks can substantially affect housing prices. In particular, lowering down payment require-
ments induces entry of new buyers in the market and higher asset accumulation by current
searchers, as these agents target more expensive (less congested) submarkets. This affects the
distribution of prices and trading probabilities, and thereby the wealth distribution. Our quan-
titative results suggest that the effects on the long-run level and dispersion of housing prices
can be significant.
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1 Introduction
In the expansion prior to the Great Recession housing prices experienced significant increases at
the same time that credit conditions eased greatly. It is a widely held view that the increase in
the availability of credit fueled the housing boom (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2012; Landvoigt et al., 2015;
Favara and Imbs, 2015). However, changes in financial constraints typically do not have significant
quantitative effects in traditional Walrasian macroeconomic models. This paper identifies a novel
amplification mechanism by which changes in credit constraints can substantially affect housing
prices when real estate transactions are subject to search and matching frictions.
We embed a competitive search model of the real estate market into a heterogeneous agent
setting where households face credit constraints. The equilibrium features price dispersion, as
wealthier buyers sort into submarkets with higher prices and shorter average buying times. In this
setting, loosening credit constraints induces not only the entry of new buyers in the market but
also higher asset accumulation by current searchers, as these agents direct their search to more
expensive submarkets, where they are more likely to trade. The entire distribution of prices and
trading probabilities, and thereby the wealth distribution, are affected by these changes in the
extensive and intensive margins generated by increased buyer competition. We calibrate the model
to illustrate its numerical comparative static properties and find that the implied effects on the
long-run level and dispersion of housing prices can be significant (relative to a Walrasian model).
Search models constitute a powerful mechanism for demand shocks to affect aggregates; see,
for instance, Díaz and Jerez (2013). A growing number of quantitative studies uses these models
to account for several dynamic and cyclical features of housing markets (e.g. Díaz and Jerez, 2013;
Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014; Head et al., 2014; Hedlund, 2016b; Garriga and Hedlund, 2017). Yet
most of this literature assumes that households are risk neutral and ignores their savings decisions.
The recent contributions by Hedlund (2016a 2016b), Garriga and Hedlund (2017) and Eerola and
Maattanen (2018) are notable exceptions which we discuss below.
We consider a partial equilibrium setting where households consume a nondurable good and
housing services. Households face idiosyncratic turnover shocks which make them want to change
residence, and they can either own their home (an indivisible durable good) or rent. Home pur-
chases can be partially financed with non-defaultable mortgage loans, and buyers must search for
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a home in a decentralized market where prices and trading probabilities are determined by com-
petitive/directed search. Households can accumulate a risk-free asset both to put a down payment
on a home and to smooth non-housing consumption. To keep things simple, we abstract away
from idiosyncratic income risk and assume a fixed stock of owner-occupied housing consisting of
symmetric units (which do not depreciate). All price dispersion arising in equilibrium is then purely
frictional. We focus our analysis on stationary equilibria.
Our model is “block recursive”, as those of Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010), meaning
that the agents’ value and policy functions do not depend on the distribution of households across
individual states.1 Instead, they depend on a finite-dimensional variable which summarizes all the
relevant information regarding the terms trade in the housing market. In the seminal models of
Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010), “block recursivity” arises from the combination of directed
search and free entry of job vacancies created by risk-neutral firms under constant returns. Here,
it arises because we assume that buyers and sellers (both of whom are risk averse) do not trade
directly with each other.2 Instead, trades are intermediated by risk-neutral agents with transferable
utility who freely enter the market (see also Hedlund, 2016a; Karahan and Rhee, 2019). To keep
the model as stylized as possible, we assume that sellers face no trading delays, and focus on the
frictions faced by buyers. Specifically, homeowners can sell their homes in a Walrasian market to
intermediaries, who then look for potential buyers in the decentralized market.
The model’s block-recursive structure allows us to derive several properties of the households’
value and policy functions, and to bring to light the underlying amplification mechanism. We
first show that the value functions exist and are differentiable along the optimal paths. This
suffices to obtain the Euler equations. These results are not trivial since, due to the lack of
concavity of the household’s problem, the theorems of Mirman-Zilcha and Benveniste-Scheinkman
do not apply to our setting. Menzio et al. (2013) circumvent the technical difficulties arising from
the non-concavity by introducing lotteries. This makes the model tractable, but obviously not
equivalent to the original problem since the optimal policy functions differ. In this paper, we do
not need to introduce lotteries but work directly within the non-concave framework. We show
that the value functions are concave (on the range of assets that corresponds to participation and
non-participation in the decentralized market, respectively) and their optimal choices are unique
1This is unlike random search models with an endogenous asset distribution, which are known to be intractable
precisely for this reason (e.g. Molico, 2006).
2Dealing with a setting with two-sided heterogeneity and two-sided risk aversion would be highly involved.
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provided the optimal consumption policies are monotone.3 These theoretical results are derived
by adapting the approach recently introduced in Rincón-Zapatero (2020). This approach does
not directly apply to the Bellman equations of our model (due to their particular structure), so
additional work is required. To the best of our knowledge, these results are novel and provide
a new benchmark for analyzing similar block-recursive search models with an endogenous asset
distribution without the need of introducing lotteries.
In equilibrium home buyers with higher financial wealth (who have a lower marginal utility
of wealth) direct their search to submarkets with higher prices, where buying times are shorter
on average. In turn, more expensive homes take longer to sell. These results are consistent with
empirical work in the real estate literature which finds that, after controlling for housing attributes
and location, buyers with higher income tend to pay higher prices (see Elder et al., 1999; Qiu and
Tu, 2018), and search for a shorter period of time on average (see Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla
1999, 2000). There is also widespread evidence of a positive relationship between the price of real
estate property and its average time on the market (e.g. Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; de Wit
and van der Klaauw, 2013). Frictional house price dispersion is hard to measure since houses are
hedonic goods which are heterogeneous along many dimensions (some of which are unobservable).
Yet several hedonic studies find variations in house prices after controlling for house characteristics
and location using data for different countries (e.g. Malpezzi et al., 1980; Elder et al., 1999; Leung
et al., 2006; Yiu et al., 2008).4
To compute the equilibrium, we adapt the endogenous grid method used by Fella (2014) in
a model with exogenous non-convex adjustment costs to our search environment (where trading
delays are endogenous). Fella’s algorithm yields substantial gains in accuracy and computational
time relative to standard techniques used to solve non-concave problems. In particular, this method
is much more efficient and accurate than standard value function iteration, which is the approach
used in the literature to compute related search models with an endogenous distribution of assets
(e.g. Hedlund, 2016b; Chaumont and Shi, 2018; Eeckhout and Sepahsalari, 2018).
To illustrate how the model works and what its numerical comparative statics properties are,
we calibrate it to reproduce selected statistics for the U.S. economy. In our setting, any shock
3This is the case in all our numerical exercises.
4Search theory has long been used to rationalize the existence of frictional price dispersion. Recent related work
by Piazzesi et al. (2020) documents differential search patterns by buyers at the ZIP code level using data from
California’s website Trulia, and argues that these patterns can explain differences in the prices of houses with similar
characteristics across ZIP codes. Yet their model assumes risk-neutral searchers and hence no wealth effects.
3
affecting demand affects the distribution of prices paid by home buyers and thus the mean and
variance of housing prices. It also affects the trading delays buyers face and the degree of housing
market liquidity.
Our comparative statics exercises show that price dispersion, market liquidity, and wealth accu-
mulation are tightly linked and that the interaction between these equilibrium objects is crucially
affected by credit conditions. Take the case of a highly liquid market, where demand is high and
average buying times are long. In this scenario buyers who do not find a trading opportunity (a
likely event for poor households) accumulate more assets and, in the next period, they direct their
search towards more expensive submarkets, where they are more likely to trade. Hence, when
credit constraints are relaxed, these buyers can afford to enter submarkets with higher prices. In
addition, buyer participation increases, as some households who were not searching for a home (e.g.
because they were saving to build a down payment) enter the market. The increase in participation
exacerbates the overall congestion effects buyers face, thus reinforcing the aforementioned asset
accumulation process. This amplification mechanism, which operates through the inherent hetero-
geneity of the economy generated by search and matching frictions, leads to substantial increases
in the average housing price. Also, price dispersion and average selling times fall when credit is
eased, which is intuitive given the increase in competition among buyers. A rise in labor income
has similar effects, the effect on average prices being even stronger. In general, increases in housing
demand increase average housing prices and market liquidity and reduce price dispersion, whereas
negative demand shocks have the opposite effect. The effect on the wealth distribution is complex
due to the interaction between changes in prices and trading probabilities. To the best of our
knowledge these amplification effects, arising from directed search, have not been identified before.
The model’s amplification mechanism critically relies on the inelasticity of the housing supply.
In particular, with a fixed housing stock a reduction in down payment requirements has a substantial
impact on the average housing price but leaves the homeownership rate almost unaltered. Yet, in
the opposite extreme case where the housing supply is infinitely elastic, the average price does not
change but the homeownership rate rises substantially.
1.1 Related work
Eerola and Maattanen (2018) study a quantitative random search and bargaining model of the
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housing market with heterogeneous agents and a fixed supply of identical homes, calibrated to
Finish data. These authors also find that tightening credit constraints reduces housing market
liquidity and increases frictional price dispersion, and present empirical evidence which is consistent
with this finding. Their model is more involved, as they allow for idiosyncratic income risk and
assume that buyers and sellers trade directly with each other. Its main drawback is its lack of
tractability (as it is not block recursive). In particular, these authors cannot study how changing
credit conditions affect the homeownership rate and the wealth distribution. Instead, all their
exercises are performed by keeping the homeownership rate fixed (as they cannot perform actual
across-steady state comparisons). The mechanism generating frictional price dispersion is also
different. Since search is random, wealthier and poorer traders are equally likely to meet potential
trading partners. Yet, conditional on a match, wealthier buyers are more likely to complete a
transaction and pay higher prices on average because they have higher reservation prices. We
view the two mechanisms as complementary explanations of why wealth inequality may generate
frictional housing price dispersion.
Hedlund (2016a 2016b) develops a related quantitative model with several features which we ab-
stract from, such as trading delays affecting homeowners, idiosyncratic income risk, heterogeneous
housing units, an endogenous supply of mortgage credit, and equilibrium default. He introduces a
slightly different intermediation sector which renders the model block-recursive and assumes that
new homes can be built instantaneously within a period under decreasing returns.5
Hedlund (2016a) studies how the interaction between search frictions and credit constraints
affects the cyclical behavior of housing market aggregates. His key finding is that the increasing
illiquidity of housing assets characteristic of a slowdown tightens credit constraints for borrowers
(who find it harder to sell their homes). This creates a vicious circle that increases foreclosures
and further depresses the housing market. Hedlund (2016b) uses a model variant with aggregate
productivity shocks to study cyclical housing dynamics and to assess the effects of stabilization
policies. Garriga and Hedlund (2019) study another variant where a combination of higher downside
labor earnings risk and tighter credit conditions can explain a substantial share of the fall in prices
during the Great Recession. The emphasis in these quantitative papers is then on the frictions
5 There are two competitive search markets where intermediaries trade with homeowners and buyers, respectively.
There is also a Walrasian market where these intermediaries trade with each other and with home builders. The fact
that this market clears every period implies that, if the number buyers who trade with an intermediary (total home
purchases in the first search market) exceeds the number of homeowners who trade with an intermediary (total sales
in the second search market) in a given period, new homes must be built during the period to meet demand.
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sellers face, whereas we focus on those faced by buyers. Whereas the former are more relevant
during a bust, the latter should be more relevant during a boom, as pointed out by Garriga and
Hedlund (2019). We thus view our work as complementary.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment and the problems
solved by agents and define a stationary equilibrium. Section 3 presents our theoretical results.
Section 4 discusses our computational method, the calibration, and our main comparative-statics
results. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and computational details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model economy
2.1 Preferences and endowments
Consider a location populated by a continuum of households who live forever. Time is discrete.
Households derive utility from a divisible consumption good and the service flow provided by an
indivisible durable good which we refer to as housing. Their lifetime utility is ∑∞t=0E0βtu(ct, ht),
where ct, ht ∈ R+ are the amounts of the divisible good and housing services consumed each period,
respectively, and β is the discount factor. The function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and
C2, with uch ≥ 0 and limh→0 u(c, h) = −∞. Each period households have a fixed endowment w
of the consumption good (the numeraire) and can choose to either own or rent a (single) housing
unit. The stock of owner-occupied housing consists of H symmetric units that do not depreciate.
Each period homeowners face i.i.d. preference shocks and can be in two states, µ ∈ {0, 1}.
Owners in state 1 consume ~ > 0 units of housing services, whereas owners in state 0 consume
none. Owners in state 1 are then matched with their home, and owners in state 0 are mismatched.
The state µ follows a Markov process with transition probabilities P (µ′ = 1|µ = 1) = 1−piµ ∈ (0, 1)
and P (µ′ = 0|µ = 0) = 1. So µ = 0 is an absorbing state; owners can only transit out of this
state by selling their home and moving to a new unit. By contrast, renters consume an exogenous
amount hr of housing services, where 0 < hr ≤ ~.6
Households face also idiosyncratic moving shocks (which are realized jointly with the owners’
preference shocks). Owners and renters are hit by these independent shocks with different time-
6We thus allow for a taste for ownership.
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invariant probabilities, denoted by piξ0 , piξr ∈ (0, 1), respectively.7 Households hit these shocks
migrate to a symmetric location in the rest of the world at no cost, and are instantaneously replaced
by an equal mass of immigrants. The details on these entry flows are specified below. We normalize
the constant measure of households in the location to one.
Our model abstracts away from idiosyncratic labor income risk and aggregate risk. We just
introduce the minimum amount of idiosyncratic risk needed to generate turnover in the housing
market. The omission of idiosyncratic income risk is very restrictive, in particular, in terms of the
wealth distribution generated by the calibrated model. Yet this omission allows us to keep the
model tractable to derive our theoretical results and to bring to light the underlying amplification
mechanism. We elaborate on this in Section 5.
2.2 Market arrangements and real estate intermediation
Households can save by means of a risk-free asset with return R. Their home purchases can be
partially financed with a non-defaultable mortgage loan. Specifically, a household can borrow up to
a fraction (1− δ) of the home’s liquidation value, so it must save to meet the corresponding down
payment. The mortgage is a loan in perpetuity with no costs associated if there is early repayment.
Houses also serve as collateral for loans: homeowners can obtain a home equity loan for up to a
fraction (1− δ) of the home’s value (i.e., they can always remortgage). There are indirect taxes on
real estate transactions. Home sellers pay taxes on the value of the house at the rate τs, whereas the
buyers’ tax rate is τb. For simplicity, we assume that tax revenues are thrown away. Also, there is
no spread between borrowing and lending rates, and households who do not own residential assets
cannot borrow.8
Real estate transactions are intermediated by agents with linear transferable utility and deep
pockets who are free to enter the economy. These agents purchase homes from mismatched home-
owners, and then look for potential buyers. Intermediaries are also infinitely-lived with discount
factor β and can hold at most one unit each period, and they do not pay taxes. We do not model
the rental market explicitly, and assume that households who rent do so at a fixed price rh.
Below we specify the timing of the model, and describe the market structure in detail. Each
7We introduce the moving shocks for quantitative purposes, specifically to match migration flows. In the data,
renters move more often than owners (e.g. Head et al. (2014)).
8These financial market arrangements are as in Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008).
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period is divided into three subperiods: morning, afternoon, and night.
2.2.1 Morning
At the start of a period, there are two types of households in the economy depending on their
tenure status: owners and renters. First, preference and moving shocks are realized. Then, a
Walrasian market opens where the owners who have been hit by these shocks supply their homes
inelastically.9 Intermediaries can freely enter this market to purchase a unit at the market clearing
price, p. Once the market closes, the households who were hit by the moving shock migrate and
are replaced by an equal measure of immigrants who do not own residential assets.
Note that homeowners do not face trading delays in our model; it is intermediaries who face
the inventory risk, as we shall see. Yet this risk will be priced into p. We introduce the Walrasian
market because it highly simplifies the analysis, allowing us to focus on the frictions buyers face.
2.2.2 Afternoon
During the afternoon, those households who sold their home in the morning and did not migrate,
those who were renters in the previous period, and the newly arrived immigrants decide whether
or not to search for a home to buy. We refer to these households as potential buyers. Matched
homeowners make no economic decisions in this subperiod, so we refer to them as non-traders.
A competitive search market operates in the afternoon where intermediaries put their vacant
homes up for sale at cost κs > 0.10 Buyers may borrow up to a fraction 1− δ of the home’s value
in the Walrasian morning market; i.e., their borrowing limit is (1− δ) p. The implicit assumption
(as in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) is that banks lend the amount they can recover in the Walrasian
market if they seized the house. Potential buyers may choose not to participate in the afternoon
market (e.g. if they have not accumulated enough assets to meet the corresponding down payment).
As in Moen (1997), buyers and intermediaries can participate in different submarkets where they
meet bilaterally and at random, and where each trader experiences at most one bilateral match.
9This is optimal for mismatched owners as limh→0 u(c, h) = −∞. It is also optimal for owners who are hit by the
moving if they face a sufficiently high cost of leaving their home unsold.
10We assume that buyers search for a home at a negligible cost. This rules out equilibria where some households
participate in the frictional market even though they do not plan to trade there (because doing so is costless).
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The matching probabilities in a given submarket depend on the associated buyer-seller ratio θ (or
market tightness). Specifically, an intermediary is matched to a buyer with probability ms(θ),
and a buyer is matched to an intermediary with probability mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ.11 As is standard,
ms(θ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and C2, with ms(0) = 0 and limθ→∞ms(θ) = 1, and
mb(θ) is strictly decreasing and C2, with limθ→0mb(θ) = 1 and limθ→∞mb(θ) = 0. In words,
the higher the buyer-seller ratio θ, the easier it is for intermediaries to contact buyers, and the
harder it is for buyers to locate a home for sale (due to congestion externalities). As θ goes to
infinity (zero) the intermediary’s matching probability goes to one (zero), and the buyer’s matching
probability goes to zero (one). The elasticity η(θ) ≡ m′s(θ)θms(θ) ∈ [0, 1] is assumed non increasing, and
mˆs(mb) ≡ ms(m−1b (·)) is such that ln mˆs is concave.12
To describe the price determination process in the competitive search market, we adopt the
price-taking approach in Jerez (2014). The idea is to think of houses traded in submarkets with
different tightness levels θ ∈ R+ as different commodities, which are characterized by different
degrees of trading uncertainty. The prices of these differentiated commodities are described by a
continuous function p : Θ→ R+. That is, p(θ) is the housing price in a submarket with tightness
θ ∈ R+. Buyers and intermediaries choose the submarkets they enter taking p(θ) as given and have
rational expectations about the tightness level prevailing in active submarkets. To model market
participation, we introduce a “fictitious submarket” θ0 ∈ R−, and extend the functions mb, ms and
p to Θ ≡ R+ ∪ {θ0} by setting mb(θ0) = ms(θ0) = p(θ0) = 0. Households who choose submarket
θ0 do not participate in the afternoon market.
As shown in Jerez (2014), our price-taking equilibrium notion is equivalent to that of directed
search. In particular, p(θ) is the inverse of the schedule θ(p) describing the agents’ beliefs (about
the tightness level in submarkets with different prices) in directed search models. We choose the
price-taking formulation because it makes the connection with the standard notion of recursive
competitive equilibrium more direct and transparent. The crucial difference with the standard
notion is that the frictional afternoon market does not clear in equilibrium.
11The underlying assumption is that the total number of bilateral trading meetings is determined by a matching
function with constant returns to scale and that the Law of Large Numbers holds.
12Equivalently, −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is non decreasing. This assumption guarantees that the problem solved by
potential buyers is concave and has a unique solution (see Sections B-D in the Appendix), and can be further relaxed
(see Section E.1). See also Menzio and Shi (2010) where mˆs is assumed concave (a slightly stronger assumption).
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2.2.3 Night
Households who bought a home in the afternoon are owners at night, just as the non-traders. The
rest of the households are renters. At night households receive the endowment, w, and decide their
non-housing consumption and the level of assets to be carried to the next period.
2.3 Stationary equilibrium
Below we state the problems of the agents in each subperiod, starting at night and going backward.
A stationary equilibrium is then defined.
2.3.1 Night
Recall that intermediaries are inactive at night. Let A = [a,∞) be the set in which the households’
financial assets can take values, and let a ∈ A be the household’s assets at the start of the night. The
afternoon value functions of potential buyers and non-traders are Wb : A → R and Wn : A → R,
respectively. The night value function of an owner is given by
Wo(a) = max
c,a′∈R
{
u (c, ~) + β (1− piξo) (1− piµ) Wn (a′)
+β [1− (1− piξo) (1− piµ)] Wb (a′ + (1− τs) p)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w + a,
a′ ≥ −(1− δ) p,
c ≥ 0,
(2.1)
where c and ~ are the amounts of the divisible good and housing services consumed, and a′ is the
level of financial assets carried to the next period. Owners choose the values of c and a′ to maximize
their expected lifetime utility subject to a standard intertemporal budget constraint and also face a
borrowing limit equal to (1− δ) p. (As described earlier, they can remortgage their home, in which
case the price of reappraisal is the Walrasian market price.) With probability piξo , owners will be
hit by a moving shock on the next morning. If not, there is still a probability piµ that they will
move to another location. An owner who is not hit by any of these shocks will be a non-trader
in the next afternoon, with continuation value Wn(a′). An owner who is hit will sell her home at
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price p in the next morning and pay the corresponding indirect taxes. Note that the assumption
that agents hit by a moving shock migrate to a symmetric location at no cost implies that the
owner’s continuation value is the same regardless of the kind of shock that hits her. Owners hit
by the preference (but not by the moving) shock will be potential buyers in their current location,
whereas owners hit by the moving shock will be potential buyers elsewhere. In both cases, their
continuation value is Wb(a′ + (1− τs) p). Denote the owners’ optimal policies by gco(a) and gao (a).
The night value function of a renter is defined in a similar way:
Wr(a) = max
c,a′∈R
{
u (c, hr) + βWb (a′)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w − rh + a,
a′ ≥ 0,
c ≥ 0,
(2.2)
and gcr(a) and gar (a) denote the optimal decision policies. The main difference is that these house-
holds pay the rent, rh, consume hr units of housing services, and are not allowed to borrow. Also,
their continuation value is not affected by the moving shocks they face. These agents will be
potential buyers in the next afternoon (either in the current location or in a symmetric one).
2.3.2 Afternoon
Let a be the household’s financial assets at noon. Non-traders are inactive during the afternoon,
so their value function is given by
Wn(a) = Wo(a). (2.3)
Potential buyers choose the submarkets they join taking as given the price schedule, p(θ), and the
maximum loan they can obtain, (1− δ) p. Their value function is given by
Wb(a) = max
θ∈Θ
{
mb (θ) Wo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ)) + (1−mb (θ)) Wr (a)
}
s. t. a− (1 + τb) p(θ) ≥ −(1− δ) p if θ ∈ R+,
(2.4)
and gθb (a) denotes their optimal decision rule. The collateralized borrowing constraint in problem
(2.4) ensures that buyers who join submarket θ ∈ R+ have enough assets to pay for the corre-
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sponding down payment and the associated taxes. With probability mb(θ) these households buy a
home and enter the night with financial assets a− (1+ τb) p(θ).13 With complementary probability,
they do not trade and carry their full assets into the night, when they will be renters (just as those
potential buyers who choose not to participate in the afternoon market).
Likewise, intermediaries choose the submarkets they join in order to maximize their expected
lifetime value given p(θ), so their expected value in the afternoon is
J = max
θ∈R+
{
− κs +ms (θ) p(θ) + (1−ms (θ)) β J
}
. (2.5)
Intermediaries who join submarket θ ∈ R+ pay the cost κs and sell their unit with probability
ms(θ) at price p(θ), in which case they exit the location. With complementary probability, they do
not trade and must wait until the next afternoon, when they will continue to search for a buyer.
We denote the set of optimal solutions for problem (2.5) by ΘJ .14
2.3.3 Morning
Recall that, during the morning, owners hit by a shock sell their home at price p to the intermediaries
that enter the Walrasian market (whereas the rest of the households are inactive). Since entry is
free, the expected profits of these intermediaries are zero in equilibrium:
p = J. (2.6)
2.3.4 Stationary equilibrium definition
The distribution of non-traders and potential buyers at noon is described by the Borel measures
ψn, ψb ∈ M+(A), respectively. Similarly, ψo, ψr ∈ M+(A) represent the distribution of owners and
13Households with a mortgage have negative assets at night and pay interests on that debt, as implied by the
intertemporal budget constraint in (2.1).
14As we shall see, in equilibrium, ΘJ includes a continuum of elements, intermediaries being indifferent between
all θ ∈ ΘJ (see Section 3).
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renters at night. Since the total mass of households is one,
ψn(A) + ψb(A) = 1, (2.7)
ψr(A) + ψo(A) = 1. (2.8)
We describe the asset distribution of immigrants by an exogenous probability measure ζi ∈ P (A) ⊂
M+(A). Since net migration flows are zero, the inflow of immigrants is given by ψi ∈M+(A) with
ψi
ψi(A)
= ζi, (2.9)
ψi(A) = piξrψr(A) + piξoψo(A). (2.10)
The law of motion of
{
ψo, ψr, ψn, ψb, ψi
}
is described in Appendix A.
A measure b ∈ M+(R+) describing the distribution of buyers across submarkets θ ∈ R+ is
easily constructed from ψb and gθb :
b(Ξ) = ψb
(
{a ∈ A : gθb (a) ∈ Ξ}
)
, for all Borel Ξ ⊂ R+. (2.11)
In words, b(Ξ) is the measure of buyers who participate in a submarket θ ∈ Ξ. Similarly, we describe
the distribution of intermediaries across submarkets by s ∈ M+(R+). The support of s contains
elements θ ∈ ΘJ which solve problem (2.5). The precise distribution s on ΘJ will be determined
by rational expectations (see equation (2.16) below). The set of active submarkets (which attract
both buyers and intermediaries) is given by the intersection of the supports of b and s.
It remains to describe the law of motion of the vacancy stock held by intermediaries. Let V˜ be
the stock at the start of a period, which is equal to the mass of intermediaries who did not sell their
units in the previous period. The mass of new intermediaries who enter the Walrasian morning
market, ∆V , is equal to the number of units supplied in this market (by the owners who are hit
by either a moving or a preference shock) since this market clears in equilibrium. That is,
∆V = [piξo + piµ (1− piξo)] ψo(A). (2.12)
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The vacancy stock held by intermediaries at noon is then
V = V˜ + ∆V. (2.13)
These are the units which are up for sale in the afternoon:
V =
∫
θ∈R+
ds = s(ΘJ). (2.14)
Those intermediaries who do not trade in the afternoon carry their inventories into the next period:
V˜ ′ =
∫
θ∈R+
[1−ms(θ)] ds. (2.15)
We are now ready to define a stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1. A recursive stationary equilibrium for this economy, given the interest rate R−1, the
rental housing price rh and the probability distribution of the immigrants’ asset holdings ζi, is a list
of value functions and optimal decision policies for the households
{
Wo,Wr,Wn,Wb, g
c
o, g
a
o , g
c
r, g
a
r , g
θ
b
}
,
a value J and a set ΘJ of optimal decisions for intermediaries in the afternoon, prices (p, p(·)),
Borel measures
{
ψo, ψr, ψn, ψb, ψi, b, s
}
, and positive real numbers (V,∆V ) such that:
1.
{
Wo,Wr,Wn,Wb, g
c
o, g
a
o , g
c
r, g
a
r , g
θ
b
}
solve the households’ problems in (2.1)–(2.4) given (p, p(·)).
2. J and ΘJ solve the intermediary’s problem in (2.5) given p(·), and the zero profit condition
(2.6) holds.
3. All agents have rational beliefs about the tightness levels prevailing in active submarkets during
the afternoon:
∫
θ∈Ξ
db =
∫
θ∈Ξ
θ ds, for all Borel Ξ ⊂ R+, (2.16)
where b is given by (2.11), and supp s ⊂ ΘJ .
4. The Walrasian morning market clears: ∆V is given by (2.12).
5. The vacancy stock at the start each period is stationary: ∆V =
∫
θ∈R+ ms(θ) ds.
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6. The total number of homes that are either owner-occupied or for sale in the afternoon is equal
to the housing stock: V + ψn(A) = H.
7. The stationary probability measures
{
ψo, ψr, ψn, ψb, ψi
}
satisfy equations (2.7)–(2.10) and the
associated laws of motion.
The only equilibrium condition that is not self-explanatory is (2.16). This rational expectations
condition ensures that the measures of buyers and intermediaries in each active submarket are
consistent with the tightness levels that agents take as given when they make their optimal afternoon
decisions. Intuitively, ds represents the density of intermediaries and db represents the density of
buyers in the set of active submarkets. If the traders’ conjectures about θ are correct then db
should be equal to θ ds. Formally, (2.16) says that b is absolutely continuous with respect to s,
with Radon-Nikodym derivative θ. The supports of b and s then coincide almost everywhere, and
this common support gives the set of submarkets which are active in equilibrium.
3 Block-recursivity and equilibrium characterization
In this section, we show that the equilibrium price schedule p(·)—an infinite-dimensional object
which is used to calculate the households’ value and policy functions—is pinned down by the value
of p. The equilibrium is block recursive because the problems solved by individual households do not
depend on the distribution of households over financial assets. They only depend on the Walrasian
price (a scalar). Given p, households know the price schedule p(θ), which is all they need to know
to make their optimal decisions. The households’ asset distribution only affects their decisions
through its effect on p. This block-recursive structure arises because (1) search is competitive, and
(2) intermediaries have linear transferable utility and can freely enter the economy.15
15Even without free entry, our arguments go through provided the mass of intermediaries who seek to buy homes
in the Walrasian market in equilibrium is higher than the mass of sellers in that market, so intermediaries make
zero expected profits. Yet the argument would break down if there where excess supply in this market. In this case,
intermediaries would make a positive expected profit which would depend on the sellers’ asset distribution.
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3.1 Equilibrium price schedule
The intermediary’s Bellman equation, (2.5), and the zero profit condition, (2.6), imply:
p(θ) ≤ κs + (1− β) p
ms (θ)
+ β p, for all θ ∈ R+, with strict equality if θ ∈ ΘJ . (3.1)
In active submarkets, (3.1) then holds with equality, so p(θ) decreases with θ. Intuitively, since
intermediaries get the same expected payoff J in all active submarkets and the probability ms (θ)
of completing a sale increases with θ, prices are lower in those submarkets where θ is higher. Prices
in inactive submarkets imply a weakly lower expected payoff for intermediaries.
In fact, there is no loss of generality in assuming that equation (3.1) holds with equality for all
θ ∈ R+, so intermediaries get the same expected payoff in all submarkets, whether active or not.
A standard feature of general equilibrium models with a continuum of commodities is that prices
in inactive markets are indeterminate. Assuming that (3.1) holds with equality for all θ ∈ R+
is equivalent to selecting the highest prices that support the equilibrium allocation.16 With this
selection rule, p(θ) is pinned down by p. By the zero profit condition, J = p, so p is the average
return from a sale in the frictional market. As shown in Figure 1(a), p(θ) is strictly convex and
C2 (since ms is strictly concave and C2). It is also bounded below by pmin ≡ κs + p (the sum of
the Walrasian price and cost of posting a vacancy in the frictional market). The lower bound pmin
is the price intermediaries would charge if the probability of completing a sale was one (to break
even). Since trade is subject to rationing, no intermediary would trade at a lower price.
3.2 Properties of the value functions
In Appendix B we show that, given the selected price function, the dynamic programming problems
(2.1)–(2.4) admit continuous solutions Wo, Wr, Wn, and Wb which are unique in a suitable class
of functions (under quite general conditions).17 Also, Wo, Wr, and Wn are strictly increasing and
Wb is non-decreasing. Whereas these functions need not be concave and differentiable in general,
in Appendix C we show that they are differentiable along the optimal paths. This is all we need
to establish the validity of the Euler equations used in our computation. We also show that, if we
16As discussed in Jerez (2014), this price selection rule is equivalent to the restriction typically imposed on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in directed search models, known as the market utility property.
17The method of proof is classical, and is based on a contraction mapping theorem. See Theorem 1.
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restrict to the range of assets of the households who participate in the frictional market, Wo, Wr,
and Wo are strictly concave and Wb is concave provided the renters’ consumption policy function,
gcr(a), is non-decreasing on this range. The latter condition holds in all our numerical exercises.
We exploit these results to characterize the equilibrium sorting pattern and establish the existence
of a participation threshold in the next section.
3.3 The household’s afternoon problem: Sorting and participation in the frictional
market
The optimal decision rule of a buyer who participates in the afternoon market is
gθb (a) ∈ arg max
θ∈R+
{
Wr (a) +mb (θ) [Wo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ))−Wr (a)]
}
s. t. a− (1 + τb) p(θ) ≥ −(1− δ) p.
(3.2)
The buyer’s ex-post gains from trading at price p are given by
S(a, p) = Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr (a) . (3.3)
Buyers join the submarket θ ∈ R+ where their expected gains are highest. Since Wo(a), mb(θ) and
p(θ) are differentiable, gθb (a) satisfies the first-order condition for problem (3.2):
m′b(θ)S(a, p(θ))−mb(θ)W ′o (a− (1 + τb)p(θ)) (1 + τb) p′(θ) = λ(a) (1 + τb) p′(θ), (3.4)
where λ(a) is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint. If this constraint is not binding,
(3.4) simplifies to
( 1
1 + τb
)(1− η(θ)
θ
)(
S(a, p(θ))
W ′o (a− (1 + τb) p(θ))
)
= −p′(θ), (3.5)
where η(θ) is the elasticity of ms(θ). The left-hand side of (3.5) represents the buyer’s marginal
rate of substitution of θ for p. Equation (3.5) says that the buyer’s optimal choice is characterized
by a tangency between her indifference curve on the space (θ, p) and the equilibrium price function
p(θ). The optimal choice of an unconstrained buyer then attains her highest indifference curve at
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those prices (see Figure 1(a)).18
If the borrowing constraint binds,
p
(
gθb (a)
)
= a+ (1− δ) p(1 + τb) . (3.6)
Constrained buyers join the submarket where homes are sold at the maximum price they can
afford to pay given the assets they have accumulated, the taxes involved in the transaction, and
the borrowing limit (see Figure 1(b)). These buyers start the night with a negative asset position
equal to −(1− δ) p. As one would expect, for constrained buyers the shadow price of the borrowing
constraint, λ(a), decreases with a (see Lemma 1 in Appendix D). There are then three possible
cases. Either all buyers are unconstrained, they are all constrained, or the constraint only binds
below a threshold. The last case is the relevant one in our numerical exercises, as we shall see.
For a given p, the problem of a constrained buyer has a unique solution, characterized by (3.6).
The same is true for unconstrained buyers provided gcr(a) is non decreasing (and so Wo is concave)
on the range of assets that correspond to participation. In this case, there is a single tangency
point between the buyers’ indifference curves and the price schedule p(θ), meaning that buyers
with identical financial assets join the same submarket in equilibrium.19
Proposition 1. A solution for problem (3.2) exists. Moreover, if gcr(a) is non decreasing on the
range of a for which θ0 /∈ gθb (a) then gθb (a) is single-valued on this range.
We now show that buyers with different financial assets sort themselves out across submarkets
with different prices and different trading probabilities. For constrained buyers, (3.6) implies that
p(gθb (a)) increases and gθb (a) decreases with a. Under the assumption in Proposition 1, this is
also the case for unconstrained buyers provided the gains from trading at a given price p, S(a, p),
increase with a.20 In this case, the buyers’ indifference curves are steeper when a is higher (see
Figure 1(c)). Intuitively, buyers with higher financial wealth are willing to accept a larger price
18Since the schedule p(θ) corresponds to the intermediaries zero isoprofit curve on the space (θ, p), the buyer’s
indifference curve is tangent to this isoprofit curve. This is the standard characterization of a competitive search
equilibrium in the absence of borrowing constraints (e.g. Moen, 1997; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
19One cannot conclude from (3.5) that the buyer’s marginal rate of substitution increases along an indifference
curve as θ rises (as depicted in Figure 1(a)), since η(θ) is non-increasing. Yet we may assume that traders choose
mb rather than θ, since there is a one-to-one mapping between both variables. Under the assumption in Proposition
1, the indifference curves of buyers and the zero isoprofit curve of intermediaries in the space (mb, p) have a strictly
convex shape, so they are tangent at most one point.
20This is the case in all our computations. It is direct to check that a sufficient condition for this requirement is
that the purchase of a home always implies a lower night consumption level: gco (a− (1 + τb)pmin) < gcr(a).
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increase to increase their trading probability (while remaining indifferent) relative to buyers with
lower assets. This implies that in equilibrium wealthier buyers trade in more expensive submarkets
where average buying times are shorter. This endogenous separation of different agent types across
different submarkets is a typical property of directed search models.
Proposition 2. (Sorting by financial assets). For constrained buyers, gθb (a′) < gθb (a) if a < a′. If
gcr(a) is non decreasing the range of a for which θ0 /∈ gθb (a) and S(a, p) increases with a for each
p ≥ pmin then gθb (a) is strictly decreasing on this range (whether or not buyers are constrained).
Regarding the participation decision, under the assumptions in Proposition 2, there is a thresh-
old apart ∈ A such that potential buyers with assets a > apart strictly prefer to participate, those
with assets apart are indifferent between participating or not, and the rest do not participate. Thus
Wb(a) > Wr(a) for all a > apart, and Wb(a) = Wr(a) for a ≤ apart. The price that buyers with
assets apart pay if they participate is the lowest price in the frictional market.
Proposition 3. (Participation) Suppose that Wb(a) > Wr(a) for some a. Under the assumptions
in Proposition 2, there exists apart ∈ A such that gθb (a) ∈ R+ if a > apart, gθb (a) = θ0 if a < apart,
and gθb (apart) = {θ0, θ}, where θ is the tightness level in the cheapest active submarket.
4 Computation and calibration
To illustrate the quantitative properties of the model, we calibrate it to reproduce selected statistics
for the U.S. economy. We start by briefly discussing the computation method and our calibration
strategy. We then present the main statistics of the benchmark economy, as well as some compar-
ative statics results.
4.1 Computation
Before describing our computation method it is useful to compare our framework to related directed
search models studying the interaction between wealth accumulation and frictional wage dispersion,
such as Chaumont and Shi (2018) or Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2018). These models assume, as
we do here, that only one side of the market (workers in their setting and households in ours) is
risk averse, whereas the other (firms seeking to fill job vacancies there and intermediaries here)
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has linear transferable utility and is free to enter the economy. Our sorting result parallels that in
Chaumont and Shi (2018), whereby wealthier workers earn higher wages and take longer to switch
employment states.21 There are some important differences, though. First, these models assume
that firms may create new vacancies at a fixed cost. The equivalent of this assumption in our
setting would be to assume that intermediaries can build new homes each period at an exogenous
cost. By free entry, the Walrasian morning price, p, would be equal to this cost in equilibrium.22
We will return to this issue in Section 4.4, where we show that movements in the Walrasian price
are crucial for changes in aggregate (e.g. credit) conditions to affect the distribution of frictional
prices in our calibrated model. A second difference is that, in our setting, households use financial
assets not only to smooth (non-housing) consumption but also to build equity to pay the down
payment. This introduces a not trivial participation margin, which implies that the household’s
problem has a non-concavity which is not present in the above models. Nevertheless, as shown in
Section 3.2, the value functions have standard properties on the range of assets that corresponds
to participation and non-participation, respectively.
The computation of the model is not straightforward. One possibility is to discretize the choice
of financial assets and use value function iteration to solve the household’s problem. This is the pro-
cedure used by Chaumont and Shi (2018), Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2018) and Hedlund (2016b),
for instance. The drawback of this approach is that, by discretizing the choice of financial assets,
we would be limiting the number of submarkets that are active in equilibrium ex ante, which may
bias our results on price dispersion (especially when we conduct policy exercises). We instead apply
the results in Section 3.2 and compute the policy functions by solving the Euler equations.
Our computation uses the endogenous grid method (EGM hereafter). Specifically, we extend the
procedure in Fella (2014) to our framework. Fella (2014) modifies the EGM to include a discrete
control variable subject to exogenous non-convex adjustment costs, in addition to the standard
continuous variable. His algorithm yields substantial gains in accuracy and computational time
relative to standard techniques used to solve non-concave problems. In our model, households
make a discrete choice (participating or not in the frictional market) and two continuum choices
(the choice of submarket and savings). Instead of exogenous adjustment costs, home buyers face
21See also Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2018) and Herkenhoff (2018). Menzio et al. (2013) obtain a similar sorting
result in the context of a monetary search model.
22Transactions in labor and housing markets are fundamentally different, in particular, because households may
participate in both sides of the housing market (both buying and selling houses). Also, interactions between workers
and employers are inherently dynamic, while the housing transactions we describe are one-time transactions.
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endogenous trading delays (as the choice of submarket determines the probability of buying). In
Appendix E we describe in detail the algorithm we use to solve the household’s problem as well as
to find the stationary equilibrium.
4.2 Calibration
The model period is a month. We use the additively-separable felicity function
u (c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + log(h). (4.1)
Recall that matched owners consume ~ housing services, and renters consume hr. As in Chaumont
and Shi (2018), the matching technology is given by
ms(θ) =
(
1 + θ−γ
)−1
γ , mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ, (4.2)
with γ > 0. We use this function instead of the standard urn-ball matching function because it has
an extra degree of freedom in that γ governs the elasticity of mb(θ) with respect to θ. With the
urn-ball matching process, this elasticity is constant. The parameter γ also determines the severity
of search and matching frictions. As γ increases, frictions are reduced. Since our computation
method requires a one-to-one mapping between θ and mb, we cannot use the standard (truncated)
Cobb-Douglas matching function (which implies mb = 1 for θ sufficiently low).
Table 1 shows the calibration of the benchmark economy. We interpret the endowment of
the divisible good as labor income and set w = 1000. We calibrate the preference and mobility
shocks to match the following observations on household turnover. According to the National
Association of Realtors (NAR), the average tenure length for US homeowners is around ten years.
As in Head et al. (2014), we have assumed that households move across locations and target the
annual frequency of owners and renters moving across counties in the US, which is about 3.2 and
12 percent, respectively, according to the Census Bureau. The three targets combined are used to
calibrate the probabilities of the three shocks, piµ, piξo , and piξr . The risk aversion parameter is set
equal to σ = 2, which is a standard value. Regarding the value of housing services, the ratio hr/~
is the key parameter that determines the homeownership rate in our model. We target this rate for
working-age households in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The average homeownership
21
rate for the 1989-2007 waves is 69.43 percent, and the implied value for hr/~ is 0.99. We set the
discount factor to match the median wealth to earnings ratio for working-age renters observed in
the data. The average of this statistic in the SCF is 0.34.
According to the NAR the median time to buy (TTB) is between 10 to 12 weeks. Thus, we set
γ so that the median TTB in the steady state is 11 weeks. We choose the owner-occupied housing
stock, H, to match the median housing wealth to earnings ratio for working-age owners in the SCF,
which is 2.72.
The real return to the risk-free asset, R, is such that its implicit annual return is 3.91 percent,
as calibrated in Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2010). The American Housing Survey reports that the
median housing cost-to-income ratio for renters for the last 10 years is about 28 percent. This
includes the cost of maintenance and utilities. Thus, we take rh to be 25 percent of the monthly
wage. We follow Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and set the tax on home purchases, τb, to 2.5
percent, and the tax on sales, τs, to 6 percent. The cost of posting a vacancy, κs, is set to zero.
The down payment parameter, δ, is set to 0.5 to match the median loan-to-value ratio observed
in the SCF for working-age households. The average of this statistic for the 1989–2007 waves is
41.04 percent. The reason for this calibration choice (instead of setting δ = 0.2, which is a more
typical number in the literature) is to have a meaningful tenure choice. Díaz and Luengo-Prado
(2008) show that, in the absence of risk, all households make the same tenure choice regardless
of their wealth; i.e., they all either rent or own, depending on the value of the user cost of owner
occupied-housing relative to the rental price of housing. Here, households do face idiosyncratic risk
but this risk is so small that they all participate in the afternoon market and end up owning a
home for low values of δ. We will return to this issue in Section 4.4.
We have assumed that immigrants own no residential assets. Since we do not have a sensible
way to calibrate the distribution of their financial assets, we assume that they all enter the location
with zero assets.
4.3 The benchmark economy
Next, we discuss the properties of the household’s policy functions, as well as some key aggregate
and distributional implications of our benchmark.
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4.3.1 Household’s policy functions
Panel (a) of Figure 2 depicts the price paid by buyers with different financial assets, which is given
by gp(a) ≡ p(gθ(a)). Panel (b) depicts the associated trading probabilities. Potential buyers with
financial assets below 1.40 times annual earnings do not participate in the afternoon market. We
refer to a buyer with this threshold level of assets, apart, as the marginal buyer. This buyer faces a
binding borrowing constraint and directs her search to a submarket where the price of a house is
2.66 times her accumulated wealth. Upon completing a transaction, her mortgage amounts to 1.32
times her annual earnings, which is the collateralized borrowing limit, (1−δ) p. The probability that
she buys a home is only 0.07 though. The borrowing constraint binds for any buyer with financial
wealth below 1.46 times annual earnings. For constrained buyers, the probability of buying a home
rises very rapidly with a. For instance, it reaches 0.35 for the threshold level of assets above which
the borrowing constraint no longer binds. Any buyer whose wealth is greater than 2.87 times annual
earnings buys a home upfront and does not get a mortgage loan. A buyer whose wealth is equal to
this level trades with probability 0.49 and pays 2.78 times her annual earnings for the house.
Let us turn to the renters’ savings decision. As shown in panel (c) of Figure 2 (red line),
consumption falls with assets for poor renters (as they save to buy a home). Yet, as soon as
they have accumulated enough assets to participate in the frictional market, consumption starts
rising with assets. For instance, a renter with zero assets has to wait for 7.58 years to become a
marginal buyer. If she does not trade (the most likely event for a marginal buyer), she will increase
her savings further and will direct her search to a submarket with a higher price in the following
period, where the probability of trading is higher. This probability rises slowly with a for high
wealth levels though, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 2. This and the fact that households discount
the future imply that the savings policy function of a renter is smooth and standard for levels of
financial assets above apart. This function has a fixed point: renters whose financial assets are
1.47 times their annual earnings consume their income and role over their wealth. Any renter with
more assets depletes them as the probability of buying is not large enough to compensate for lower
non-housing consumption. The renter at the fixed point (whose assets are 1.47 times her annual
earnings) directs her search to the submarket where the price is 2.72 times her annual earnings and
gets a mortgage below her borrowing limit. This also implies that, at a steady state, the support
of the financial wealth distribution of renters is the interval [0, 1.47 × 12w]. The support is so
compressed because the probability of buying, mb, rises very slowly with a for high wealth levels.
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For instance, the largest point of the grid is equal to 20 times annual earnings. A renter so rich
directs her search to a submarket where the price is 3 times her annual earnings and mb is 0.69.
The elasticity ofmb(θ) is key to determine the support of the financial wealth distribution of renters
and, therefore, that of the price distribution in the frictional market.
Consider now the owners’ savings decisions. We do not show their savings policy function
because it is very smooth and concave, as owners are hit by a mismatch or a moving shock only
every 10 years on average. Since the model period is a month, their behavior is very similar to
the case in which they face no idiosyncratic risk at all. The fixed point of the policy function
corresponds to a value of a equal to -1.04 times their annual earnings. Hence, in equilibrium all
owners hold debt. Yet their net worth—the value of all assets minus liabilities—is positive, for
the following reason. Take a home buyer who exhausts the borrowing limit and becomes an owner
with a mortgage equal to (1 − δ) p. In equilibrium, the Walrasian price equals 2.65 times annual
earnings, and recall that δ = 0.5. Valuing her home at this price, the owner’s net worth is equal to
δ p, which amounts to 1.32 times her earnings. Yet, if she sells her home, she will have to pay τs p
in taxes. Her liquid wealth is then (δ − τs) p, which is 1.16 times her earnings. An owner whose
assets equal -1.04 times her earnings (the fixed point of the policy function) holds a net worth,
a+ p, equal to 1.60 times her earnings, whereas her liquid wealth is 28.09 percent of her earnings.
To sum up, in this economy renters hold positive financial assets and all owners hold debt.
Renters accumulate assets to finance a down payment. This is so because the probability that
owners are hit by a shock is low and so is the interest rate of mortgages, R− 1 (given the discount
factor β). In terms of net worth, owners’ wealth is much more concentrated than that of renters
(who only hold financial wealth).
4.3.2 Aggregate implications
Table 2 shows some selected targeted statistics of the benchmark economy. The homeownership
rate is 69.69 percent, a bit higher than in the data. The median of the ratio of housing wealth
to annual earnings for working-age owners in the data is 2.70. We take as the model counterpart
for median housing wealth the median price paid by home buyers; the ratio of this median price
to annual earnings equals 2.72. The median loan-to-value ratio in the model (and in the data)
is calculated in the following way. We take the (working age) owners who hold negative financial
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assets (mortgages in the data). We then calculate the median of their financial assets and divide
them by the median housing wealth. This statistic is 41.04 percent in the data and 38.62 percent
in the model. The median wealth-to-earnings ratio for renters is 0.35 in the data, and 0.29 in the
model, which is a bit low. But recall that we are assuming away any income risk that would result
in precautionary savings. The median TTB is 11.55 weeks in the frictional market, which is within
the range of about 10–12 weeks reported by NAR.23
Next, we analyze the implications of the model for some key non-targeted statistics. Take the
rent-to-price ratio, a typical index used to measure the return to housing. According to Sommer
and Sullivan (2018), in the data, this ratio is between 8 and 15 percent. To calculate the equivalent
statistic in the model we need to take a stand on which is the reasonable statistic for house prices.
On the one hand, houses are sold at price p in the Walrasian market. On the other hand, we have
the cross-sectional house price distribution in the frictional market. Note that, regardless of its
purchasing price, the liquidation value of a house is p. This is why we report the rent-to-price ratio
as the annual rent divided by p. This ratio is 9.43 percent in the steady state, which is within the
range reported by Sommer and Sullivan (2018).
Consider now average time on the market (TOM), a typical index of housing market liquidity.
Recall that the probability that a house is sold during the afternoon and thus average TOM varies
across submarkets. Also, intermediaries who do not sell their units can always choose to join a
different submarket in the next period. All these intermediaries face the same (ex-ante) expected
probability of selling in the next period. Therefore, we can calculate the expected TOM associated
with the decision to join a particular submarket. The median of the distribution of this variable is
10.19 weeks, which is within the range of 4 to 17 weeks reported by NAR. Another index of market
liquidity is months supply–the ratio of vacancies over sales in a given month (e.g. Hedlund, 2016b).
In the data, the average of this ratio was 5.47 in 2017 according to NAR, whereas in our model it
is 2.62. Finally, the model’s vacancy rate matches that in the data, although we have not used this
statistic as a target.In sum, the model does a fairly good job in matching aggregate features of the
housing market and household’s portfolio in spite of its simplicity.
23For each potential buyer with assets a ≥ apart, we calculate TTB taking into account the fact that, if the buyer
does not trade this period, she will have more assets in the next period and will then direct her search to a submarket
with a higher trading probability.
25
4.3.3 The distribution of prices and wealth
In this subsection, we analyze the distributional implications of the model. As explained in Section
4.3.1, the equilibrium price distribution in the afternoon market is very compressed. The associ-
ated standard deviation is around 1 percent (see Table 2). This is mainly because agents face a
tiny amount of idiosyncratic risk. In particular, there are no differences in labor earnings across
households, which would propagate to the wealth distribution (in the absence of complete markets)
and, from the latter to the price distribution.
Many empirical studies suggest that frictional dispersion in housing prices is significant, but
we do not have many estimates of it. For instance, Lisi and Iacobini (2013) estimate a hedonic
pricing model using Canadian data controlling for residual price dispersion (i.e., not explained by
hedonic housing attributes). They find that the mean of the prediction error falls from 16.50 to
14.15 percent when taking into account residual dispersion, whereas its standard deviation falls
from 14.62 to 12.37 percent. We thus take the difference from 16.50 to 14.15 as an estimate of the
mean prediction error due to frictional price dispersion; this number is 2.35 percent. Likewise, we
take as an estimate of the standard deviation of the prediction error the difference 14.62 – 12.47,
which is 2.25. The mean prediction error in our benchmark economy is 0.41 percent (see Table
2), which accounts for 36.12 percent of the estimate by Lisi and Iacobini (2013). The coefficient
of variation of prices is 0.51 percent, which is about 42 percent of the dispersion not explained by
observables in their paper.24
Another source of information on frictional price dispersion comes from Zillow, the online US
real estate database. Zillow’s methodology is applied to homogeneous sets of homes in a given
geographical segment and combines information about physical attributes of the home and the
land, among other things.25 As reported on their website, Zillow’s accuracy has a median error
rate of 1.9 percent at the national level. Median errors are also reported at the county and MPA
level, with substantial variation across segments for which enough data are available. For instance,
for top metropolitan areas, median errors lie between 1.2 and 3.6 percent. They report that about
16.3 percent of the transaction prices are our of the 5 percent interval of their estimate, called
24Lisi and Iacobini (2012) apply the same methodology to a rich Italian dataset which includes information about
both buyers and sellers. They find that the standard error that can be attributed to frictional dispersion is about
4.56 percent for a sample of selected Italian cities.
25Guerrieri et al. (2013) use data from Zillow to study the link between within-city migration, different house price
dynamics across neighborhoods and gentrification.
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Zestimate. Thus, if a home’s sale price is different from the Zestimate, we can attribute part of the
difference to the presence of search and matching frictions in the housing market.
To construct a model counterpart for this estimate, we calculate the average price in the after-
noon market, which is 2 percent higher than the Walrasian price. Since the distribution of prices
is very compressed, all house prices lie within a 5 percent range of the average price. Yet 5.69
percent lie out of the 1 percent range. The fact that we cannot match the magnitude of Zillow’s
error is consistent with the widely held view that unobserved heterogeneity must explain part of
the residual dispersion in housing prices. Yet our comparable statistic is about the same order of
magnitude, which leads us to conjecture that frictional dispersion may be a substantial part of the
overall residual dispersion.
Recall that all immigrants enter the economy with zero assets. Because of sorting, poorer buyers
trade with a lower probability and accumulate more assets to access a submarket where they are
more likely to trade. This behavior and the turnover due to the preference and mobility shocks
generate a non-degenerate distribution of financial assets. The Gini coefficient for renters’ wealth
is 0.53, which is pretty high; Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2010) report a coefficient of 0.89 in the 1998
SCF. Valuing homes at price p, the Gini of wealth for the total population is 0.21. This is significant
for a setting with such a tiny amount of uncertainty if we consider that the typical Gini coefficient
for household wealth in the US is about 0.8 (see Díaz and Luengo-Prado, 2010).
It will be useful to compare our results with those of Eerola and Maattanen (2018) at this
point. This should be done with caution since their environment is quite different. Specifically,
their model features two-sided risk aversion as buyers and sellers trade directly with each other, as
well as additional idiosyncratic income risk. Also, since search is random, all traders meet an agent
on the other side of the market with the same exogenous probability, but not all matches lead to
trade.26 Average TTB and TOM thus depend on the fraction of successful matches. Whether a
match leads to trade or not depends on the traders’ asset positions, and so do transaction prices
in successful matches. Wealthier buyers are more likely to trade and pay higher prices on average
because they have higher reservation prices than poorer buyers. In turn, poorer sellers who are
close to being borrowing constrained are more likely to trade than richer sellers, but at relatively
low prices because of their lower reservation prices. The coefficient of variation of prices in our
benchmark is twice the level reported in Eerola and Maattanen (2018). Yet we do not know how
26By contrast, in our model matching probabilities are endogenous and all matches lead to trade.
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much of this difference is due to random search and how much is due to two-sided risk aversion.
4.4 Comparative statics
We now discuss the steady-state effects of changes in some key parameters. In doing so, it is
instructive to compare our economy with an alternative one where the housing stock is allowed to
respond to market conditions. The alternative economy is constructed in the following way. We fix
p at its stationary value in our model and assume that intermediaries who enter the economy can
build a house at cost p before the decentralized market opens. We refer to this as the construction
economy. As discussed in Section 4.1, this economy parallels directed search models of the labor
market where new vacancies are created at an exogenous cost. This cost in turn determines the
relationship between tightness levels and equilibrium prices (the equivalent of our price schedule,
p(θ)). The difference is that here the cost, p, is endogenous.
4.4.1 Changes in credit conditions
A reduction in the down payment eases credit constraints for two reasons. First, it reduces the
amount of equity needed to participate in the frictional market. Second, it increases the liquidity
of residential assets allowing owners to smooth non-housing consumption against their housing
collateral. Note that, since there is no capital in our setup, the size of the economy is not affected.
Table 3 describes the effects of a 10 percent reduction (increase) in δ, from 0.5 to 0.45 percent
(0.55 percent, respectively). This produces about a 10 percent change of the opposite sign in the
Walrasian price (see columns two and five), which in turn shifts the equilibrium price schedule,
p(θ). Take the case of a down payment reduction. Figure 3(a) plots the prices paid by the buyers
who participate in the frictional market as a function of their assets. First, note that the function
shifts upwards (from the benchmark blue curve marked as δ = 50% to the red one marked as
δ = 45%) so, for a given level of financial assets, buyers now pay higher prices. Second, its domain
widens as poorer potential buyers now participate (apart falls). Third, its shape changes, becoming
more concave for high levels of assets. This is so because the probability of buying is an increasing
concave function of the price and the households’ marginal utility is decreasing, which implies that
price increases are smaller for wealthier buyers. The three effects, combined with the endogenous
change in the wealth distribution, determine the Walrasian price as well as the mean and variance
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of prices in the frictional market in the new steady state.
Figure 3(b) shows the average TTB as a function of the buyers’ assets. This function also shifts
(from the blue to the red curve). Specifically, there is an upward shift for high asset levels, so
wealthier buyers face a slightly longer TTB (relative to the benchmark). That is, the fact that
more buyers participate and all buyers can afford to pay higher prices results in an increase in
congestion in more expensive submarkets.
The overall effect of a 10 percent reduction in δ is a 9.81 percent increase in the Walrasian price,
a rise in the median TTB from 11.56 to 12.05 weeks, and a fall in price dispersion. Table 3 includes
two different measures of price dispersion. The first is the percentage of transaction prices out of
the 1 percent range of the average price, which falls a bit from 5.69 to 5.15 percent. The second
one is the price range–the ratio of the highest to the lowest price. This statistic falls slightly. Price
dispersion falls because of the aforementioned change in the shape of the price function in Figure
3(a) and also because the renters’ wealth distribution changes. As we can see, the Gini coefficient
of renters’ wealth falls a bit from 0.53 to 0.52. The Gini coefficient for owners’ wealth, however,
does not change. While all owners hold more debt (the median loan-to-value ratio rises from 38.69
to 43.73 percent), their housing wealth is higher too (the median housing wealth to earnings ratio
increases from 2.71 to 2.96), compensating their higher indebtedness. Finally, the median TOM
and the vacancy rate fall, so the afternoon market becomes more liquid. The homeownership rate
rises slightly from 69.69 to 69.75. This is consistent with the fact that the participation rate rises
moderately and buying times increase.
The case of an increase in the down payment is symmetric in terms of its aggregate effects
(see Table 3). The Walrasian price falls by 10% and the homeownership rate falls slightly. The
asymmetries show up in Figures 3(a) and 3(b). When δ rises, the function which gives prices that
buyers with different assets pay shifts down (as buyers pay lower prices) and its support narrows
(due to a fall in participation). The function also becomes steeper. This and the fact that the Gini
coefficient of renters’ wealth rises results in an increase in price dispersion. The market becomes
less liquid, with more vacancies, higher median TOM, and lower buying times.
To have a sense of the importance of assuming a fixed housing stock, we also report the corre-
sponding effects in the construction economy in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3. There, a 10 percent
decrease in δ does not affect the Walrasian price (by assumption), but there is a large effect on
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distributional statistics. The homeownership rate is also very sensitive to credit conditions. This
rate rises from 69.42 to 76.08 percent, as housing becomes more affordable (the rent-to-price ratio
increases). Yet neither the median TTB nor the median TOM change. This is because the in-
finitely elastic supply of housing is effectively undoing the congestion effect brought about by the
increase in housing demand. The Gini coefficient of renters’ wealth falls significantly relative to the
benchmark. Consider now to the case where δ rises to 55%. In this case, no renter wants to buy
a house anymore, since they do not want to sacrifice non-housing consumption to build the high
down payment. Hence, there are no homeowners in the new steady state and the Gini coefficient
of renters’ wealth is zero since renters do not face any risk. This exercise shows in a stark way
that the congestion buyers face in the frictional market combined with an inelastic housing supply
endogenously generate a significant amount of wealth heterogeneity.
4.4.2 The role of search and matching frictions
In the previous discussion, we have taken as given the matching technology. The importance of
the elasticity of the probability of buying with respect to the market tightness in determining the
range of equilibrium prices was emphasized in Section 4.3.1. As noted there, buyers accumulate
more assets because this allows them to avoid tighter submarkets by paying a higher price. In this
section, we investigate the importance of this channel by increasing the value of γ from 0.65 to 1.5.
This higher value implies a very large elasticity of mb with respect to θ (on the relevant range). It
also implies that search frictions are reduced relative to the benchmark.
The main statistics of the new steady state are shown in column 9 of Table 4 (labeled as ‘γ = 1.5,
fixed H’). A first key difference relative to the benchmark is that market liquidity is higher; both
the median TTB and TOM are now lower. The Walrasian price rises by 12 percent and the
participation rate falls from 7.29 to 4.33 percent due to the increase in prices. Yet the percentage
of buyers who trade in equilibrium doubles its counterpart in our benchmark. This is so buyers
trade with a higher probability. The increase in the probability of buying is particularly important
for poor buyers, who become owners at a higher rate than in the benchmark. Thus, the average
wealth of potential buyers rises, pushing prices up and reducing participation. In particular, renters
never accumulate financial assets above 1.67 of their annual wage. This level of assets is so low that,
even if these agents get a mortgage, they cannot afford a home in the afternoon. Since any renter
who is hit by the moving shock is replaced by a migrant who enters the economy with zero assets,
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the only households who participate in the frictional market are the homeowners who were hit by
a preference shock in the morning. The wealthiest owner holds negative financial wealth but, when
she is hit by the shock, her house is liquidated at the Walrasian price and her total financial wealth
is high enough to buy a new home. These forces imply that the range of prices in the frictional
market is negligible (implying that the deviation of all prices from the average price is less than
1 percent) and the average price rises by almost 12 percent relative to the benchmark. The high
elasticity of mb with respect to θ is the key factor underlying these results. Nevertheless, the effect
of increasing γ on the price level is not monotone (as we show below). For sufficiently high γ, the
reduction in search and matching frictions implies that the price level goes down relative to the
benchmark.
The matching function in (4.2) converges to the efficient matching function as γ → ∞; i.e.,
limγ→∞ms(θ) = min{θ, 1} and limγ→∞mb(θ) = min{1, θ−1}. This allows us to compare our setting
to one where search frictions are absent. For γ large (say γ = 100), the matching function is a good
approximation to the efficient one.27 In this (almost) frictionless economy, a single submarket is
active in equilibrium where all homes are sold at the Walrasian price, so there is no price dispersion.
Buyers still face trading delays, since houses are indivisible objects and there are more buyers than
intermediaries (homes for sale) in the afternoon market. By contrast, intermediaries trade with
probability one and they appropriate all the gains from a bilateral transaction (the buyers’ gains
being negligible). In this economy, the probability of buying a home does not rise with its price.
Instead, all buyers pay the same price and trade with identical probability. Therefore, renters do
not have any incentive to accumulate assets above the threshold that allows them to participate
in the afternoon market—our amplification mechanism is shut down. The main statistics of this
economy are shown in the last column of Table 2 (labeled as ‘Walrasian economy’). Note that the
Walrasian price is less than one fourth of its counterpart in our benchmark. While intermediaries
sell their homes instantaneously in the afternoon (houses are fully liquid assets), buyers face very
long buying times (68.8 weeks). The homeownership rate is equal to the per capita housing stock,
70.6447 percent. There are no vacancies overnight since the homes of all the owners who became
mismatched in the morning are sold in the afternoon by intermediaries. Even though there is
no price dispersion in this economy, wealth is nor equally distributed. This is so because renters
still have the incentive to save to participate in the housing market. Our computations show that
27We do not study the limiting economy because the matching function is not smooth (so our proofs do not apply).
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changes in the down payment have a negligible impact on the Walrasian price in this economy,
whereas the effects on the average TTB are substantial.
4.4.3 Other comparative static exercises
To give a more complete picture, we also report the steady-state effects of a permanent change in
the wage, the interest rate, transaction taxes, and the rental housing price in Table 4. The effect
of a 5 percent increase in the wage is reported in the third column. The first thing that stands out
is the 9.43 percent increase in the Walrasian price. The effect on the rest of the variables is very
similar to that of a down payment reduction. This may be surprising since (unlike a change δ) a
change in the wage does affect the size of the economy. The reason why the effect is similar is that
ours is a partial equilibrium economy: we are ignoring the general equilibrium effects on production
of the non-housing good and the interest rate. There is a difference, though, as there is a negligible
effect on the median loan-to-value ratio (which depends directly on the credit constraint). Also,
a permanent change in the wage has, in relative terms, a larger effect on prices. Our model then
suggests that increases in aggregate productivity, combined with looser credit constraints, should
have a significant impact on housing prices when the housing supply is inelastic.
It is worth mentioning that changes in transaction taxes—especially taxes on home purchases—
have also a sizable effect on the loan-to-value ratio. Finally, a reduction in the real interest rate
produces a small reduction in the Walrasian price as well as a corresponding increase in the home-
ownership rate. The effect on the price seems counterintuitive, but recall that agents do not face
any income risk. Thus, if the interest rate falls, they change the composition of consumption,
increasing their non-housing consumption. As a result, they save less and housing prices fall.
4.4.4 Discussion
In the expansion period prior to the Great Recession required down payments fell from about 20
to 1 percent, whereas the price-to-rent ratio increased between 30 and 49 percent, depending on
the price index used; see Favilukis et al. (2017). Thus, a 95 percent fall in the down payment was
accompanied by a 40 percent increase in the price-to-rent ratio. In our benchmark, a 10 percent
reduction in the down payment produces about a 9 percent change in the price-to-rent ratio. These
numbers may suggest that our mechanism over-amplifies the effects of changes in credit constraints,
32
but we should bear in mind that there is neither labor income risk and nor construction in our
benchmark. It is still useful to compare our results with those in Eerola and Maattanen (2018),
who also assume a fixed housing stock but do allow for idiosyncratic income risk. They find that a
10 percent reduction in the down payment from 95 to 85 percent brings about a rise of 6 percent
in the average housing price. Yet the homeownership rate is kept fixed in their analysis, so one
should think of this number as an upper bound.
Standard heterogeneous agents models of housing assume Walrasian markets for real estate.
Kiyotaki et al. (2011) and Sommer et al. (2013) find that changes in financial conditions have
negligible effects on housing prices in these models. This is so despite the fact that Sommer et al.
(2013) also assume a fixed housing stock. These authors find that the homeownership rate varies
significantly, though. The reason for these results is that easing financial conditions affects only
constrained agents, which represent a small fraction of the households in the economy. Favilukis
et al. (2017) stress the importance of housing risk affecting all agents regardless of their wealth,
along with sufficiently high heterogeneity, for financial conditions to have a sizable aggregate effect
on housing prices. They find that in a model economy with these ingredients, a down payment
reduction from 25 to 1 percent produces a 20 percent increase in the price-to-rent ratio. In Favilukis
et al. (2017) housing risk is a byproduct of aggregate risk. Their main insight is that the combination
of housing risk and high heterogeneity produces a significant number of “constrained” agents, which
is key for changes in financial conditions to affect prices.
Housing risk is indeed an essential part of our environment: buyers purchase a home with a
certain probability and all homeowners face a probability of realizing capital losses. Since search is
directed, agents can affect the amount of risk they face through their savings and search decisions.
In particular, the severity of search and matching frictions affects the households saving decisions
and thus the wealth distribution. Conversely, as we have seen, there is also a feedback effect from
the wealth distribution to the frictions agents face in the housing market. The key point is that,
when given additional credit, all home buyers direct their search towards a submarket with a higher
price, even if they do not face a binding credit constraint. This is why changes in credit constraints
have such a large impact on the average housing price in our benchmark. This mechanism operates
through the inherent heterogeneity of the economy which search and matching frictions generate.
This is clear when we look at the exercises where no agent wants to buy a home; when all households
are renters, they all hold the same level of wealth.
33
Our amplification mechanism critically relies on the inelasticity of the housing supply. Our
results are consistent with Favara and Imbs (2015), who are able to identify a credit supply shock
using US county and bank branches data for the period 1994-2005, and find that the response of
prices to a credit shock depends on the response of the housing stock. There are many studies
estimating housing supply elasticities. For instance, Green et al. (2005) or Gyourko et al. (2013)
show that these estimates vary widely across cities depending on the degree of land abundance and
particular regulation in each area.28 Moreover, they find that the cities which experienced a higher
price boom were those with a low elasticity of housing supply and high-income growth.
5 Final comments
The message of this paper is that changes in credit conditions and other demand shocks can be
highly amplified in the presence of search and matching frictions. In our setting, the interaction
between credit constraints and search frictions is particularly important for the response of housing
prices to a loosening of credit constraints. Our analysis suggests the effects of changes in credit con-
ditions –and, in particular, the effects on housing prices and market liquidity and the distributional
effects– critically depend on whether or not the housing stock can adjust to those changes.
We have made some strong simplifying assumptions to bring to light the underlying amplification
mechanism. The most important omission is the absence of idiosyncratic income risk. Also, we
have assumed that homeowners can sell their property in a Walrasian housing market (where there
is neither price dispersion nor trading delays). This eliminates part of the congestion that search
and matching frictions create, which is why owners hold so little wealth in our model. Hedlund
(2016a 2016b) argues that this margin is important to understand how the joint interaction between
tighter credit standards and decreasing housing market liquidity affect housing markets during a
slowdown (see also Head et al. (2019)). Finally, we have studied two extreme cases: an economy
with a fixed housing stock and one with an infinitely elastic housing supply. Both economies deliver
strikingly different effects of changes in credit constraints and other shocks. The key question is
what the empirically relevant elasticity is.
We have also abstracted away from differences in real estate properties. In a variant of the
28Housing supply restrictions are key to understand housing markets (e.g. Davis and Heathcote, 2005) and the
increase in the overall housing price dispersion in the US, in particular (e.g. Nieuwerburgh and Weill, 2010; Gyourko
et al., 2013; Albouy and Zabek, 2016).
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model with heterogenous houses, say of different quality or size, wealthier buyers would seek to buy
higher quality homes. Our conjecture is that buyers seeking to buy homes of a given type will still
sort by their level of wealth (so our mechanism should still be at work within each market segment).
Introducing a life cycle component and the possibility of a property ladder would be particularly
interesting. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) find that these elements may lead to amplified effects
of relaxing credit constraints in a model with a Walrasian housing market.29
Finally, we have also focused our attention on steady states. Studying the transitional dynamics
of our model is not trivial, for the following reason. The key state variable in our benchmark is the
Walrasian price. Out of the steady state this price, which is pinned down by the intermediary’s
zero profit condition, depends not only on current economic conditions but also on expectations
about future conditions. If intermediaries expect higher future prices, the current Walrasian price
will increase, shifting the distribution of prices paid by home buyers upwards and to the right.
Thus, expectations should play a key role out of the steady state. In the construction economy
we have studied —which parallels the labor models of Menzio and Shi (2010) and Chaumont and
Shi (2018)— this effect is absent because, in equilibrium, the Walrasian price equals the fixed cost
of building a house.30 In any case, the problem amounts to finding a sequence of prices, which is
much easier than finding sequences of higher dimensional objects. We leave all these interesting
extensions for future work.
29Another interesting question is how binding leverage constraints are throughout the wealth distribution as there
are various programs that effectively relax down payment constraints for low income households, first-time home
buyers,... Wealthier households who want to buy better properties are limited in terms of the leverage they can have,
though.
30This effect is also absent in Hedlund (2016a), where the key state variable is the price which clears the Walrasian
market where intermediaries trade with homebuilders (see footnote 5). This price depends only on current conditions
since intermediaries are not allowed to carry inventories to the next period.
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A Law of motion of the distribution of households
Let A denote the Borel σ-algebra on A. Define the transition function Qo : A × A → [0, 1] which
gives the probability that an owner holding a˜ ∈ A assets at night will carry assets a ∈ X ∈ A into
the next morning. Likewise, Qr denotes the corresponding transition function for renters. That is,
Qj(a,X) = ψj({a ∈ A : gaj (a) ∈ X}) for j ∈ {o, r}.
We use primes to denote the corresponding measures in the next period. The laws of motions
from the night to the following afternoon are
ψ′n (X) = (1− piµ) (1− piξo)
∫
a∈A
Qo(a,X)dψo, (A.1)
ψ′b (X) = (1− piξr)
∫
a∈A
Qr(a,X)dψr + piµ (1− piξo)
∫
a∈A
Qo(a,X)dψo + ψi (X) , (A.2)
for each X ∈ A. Similarly, the laws of motion from the afternoon to the night are
ψ′o (X) = ψn (X) +
∫
a∈A
Πo (a,X) dψb, (A.3)
ψ′r (X) =
∫
a∈A
Πr (a,X) dψb, (A.4)
where the transition functions Πo : A×A → [0, 1] and Πr : A×A → [0, 1] give the probability that
a potential buyer holding a assets at the start of the afternoon will be an owner or a renter with
assets in X at night, respectively. These probabilities are related to the probability that the buyer
purchases a home in the afternoon, which depends on the submarket θ she joins. A successful trade
implies, not only a change in tenure status, but also a change in the financial assets (which again
depends on θ). Specifically,
Πo(a,X) =
mb
(
gθb (a)
)
, if a− (1 + τb) p
(
gθb (a)
)
∈ X,
0, otherwise,
Πr(a,X) =
1−mb
(
gθb (a)
)
, if a ∈ X,
0, otherwise.
B Properties of the value functions
Let a denote the household’s assets in a given subperiod (either night or afternoon). Recall that
A = [a,∞) and let C(A) be the space of continuous functions f : A→ R, and E = C(A)× C(A).
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Define the Bellman operator T on E by T = (To, Tr), where
To(fo, fr)(a) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, ~) + β (1− piξo) (1− piµ) fo (a′)
+β [1− (1− piξo) (1− piµ)] Tb(fo, fr) (a′ + (1− τs) p)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w + a,
a′ ≥ −(1− δ) p,
c ≥ 0,
(B.1)
Tr(fo, fr)(a) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, hr) + β Tb(fo, fr) (a′)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w − rh + a,
a′ ≥ 0,
c ≥ 0,
(B.2)
and where Tb(fo, fr) is defined by
Tb(fo, fr)(a) = max
{
max
θ∈D(a)
{
mb (θ) fo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ)) + (1−mb (θ)) fr (a)
}
, fr(a)
}
. (B.3)
The feasible correspondence D of the inner maximization problem in (B.3) is defined by
D(a) = {θ ∈ R+ : a− (1 + τb)p(θ) + (1− δ)p ≥ 0} for a ∈ A. (B.4)
If D(a) = ∅, we attach the value −∞ to participation, and thus Tb(fo, fr)(a) = fr(a) in this case.
Also, since
p(θ) = κs + (1− β)p
ms (θ)
+ βp for all θ ∈ R+, (B.5)
limθ→∞ p(θ) = pmin. Since p is decreasing, D(a) 6= ∅ if and only if a > (1 + τb)pmin − (1− δ)p ≥ 0.
Since p is continuous in R++, D has closed sections. However, D(a) is not compact. To circumvent
this problem and be able to apply Bergé’s Maximum Theorem, we assume that agents choose mb
rather than θ. Let
pˆ(mb) =
κs + (1− β) p
mˆs (mb)
+ β p for mb ∈ (0, 1), (B.6)
and pˆ(0) = pmin. The function pˆ is continuous in [0, 1), since it is the composition of two continuous
functions when 0 < mb < 1, and, for mb = 0, limmb→0+ pˆ(mb) = limθ→∞ p(θ) = pmin. Also, since
mˆs is strictly decreasing and −mˆs′/mˆs is non decreasing, pˆ is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Finally, limmb→1− pˆ(mb) = limθ→0+ p(θ) = ∞. By choosing mb as the new decision variable, the
feasible correspondence D becomes D, as defined by
D(a) = {mb ∈ [0, 1) : a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb) + (1− δ) p ≥ 0}. (B.7)
The sections of D are nonempty and compact for a − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb) + (1 − δ) p > 0. In fact,
when nonempty, D(a) is the bounded and closed interval
[
0, pˆ−1
(
a+(1−δ) p
1+τb
)]
. Problem (B.3) thus
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transforms into
Tb(fo, fr)(a) = max
{
max
mb∈D(a)
{
mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a)
}
, fr(a)
}
. (B.8)
In Theorem 1 below, we assume that a positive level of consumption is always possible for
both owners and renters. Since an initial wealth of a = a is admissible at the initial state, a
positive consumption in the first period for owners and renters implies w + a + (1−δ)pR > 0 and
w − rh + a > 0, respectively. In particular, the first inequality implies w −
(
1− 1R
)
(1 − δ)p > 0,
which means that the owner can sustain a strictly positive level of consumption at the borrowing
limit. Another consequence of the above inequalities is that no = u
(
w + a+ (1−δ) pR , ~
)
> −∞ and
n1 = u(w− rh + a, hr) > −∞. This follows because the utility function u(c, h) is finite if c > 0, for
h ∈ {~, hr}. On the other hand, utilities may be unbounded from above. Hence, we need to control
for their rate of growth on the feasible correspondence, as well as for the size of β, to guarantee that
the dynamic programming equations define a contraction operator. Consider the number sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , aj , . . .}, where
aj =
(
Rw
R− 1 + a
)
Rj − Rw
R− 1 , j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (B.9)
Note that a ≤ aj ≤ aj+1, aj →∞ as j →∞, and a0 = a. Let
uoj = max
a∈[a,aj ]
∣∣∣∣u(w + a+ (1− δ)pR , ~
)∣∣∣∣ ,
urj = max
a∈[a,aj ]
|u (w − rh + a, hr)| ,
and uj = max{uoj , urj}. Note that both uoj and urj are well defined because n = min{no, nr} > −∞.
Define
vj :=
∞∑
i=j
βi−juj , for j = 0, 1, 2, . . .. (B.10)
The following theorem establishes the existence of a unique solution to the Bellman equation in a
suitable class of functions. The result covers both the bounded and unbounded from below cases.
Theorem 1. Suppose that n > −∞ and that
lim
j→∞
uj+1
uj
:= u < 1
β
. (B.11)
Then, the dynamic programming equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) admit unique continuous solu-
tions Wo, Wr and Wb, respectively, in the class of functions F defined by
F =
{
f ∈ C(A) : f(a) ≥ n1− β , for all a ∈ A, maxa∈[a,aj ] f(a) ≤ vj , for all j = 0, 1, . . .
}
. (B.12)
Moreover, both Wo and Wr are strictly increasing and Wb is non decreasing.
Proof. Let (fo, fr) ∈ E. If a ≤ (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ)p then the agent’s optimal choice is θ0, and
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so Tb(fo, fr)(a) = fr(a), which is continuous. When a > (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ) p, the function
(mb, a) 7→ mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) is continuous on (a,mb) ∈ A× [0, 1) and the
correspondence D defined in (B.7) is nonempty valued, compact valued, and continuous. Hence,
by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function
max
mb∈D(a)
{
mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a)
}
(B.13)
is continuous. Since Tb(fo, fr) is defined as the maximum between this value function and fr, it is
also continuous. It follows that the functions defining the right hand side of To(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr)
given in (B.1) and (B.2), respectively, are continuous. Moreover, the feasible correspondence is
nonempty valued, continuous and compact valued in both cases. Hence, by the Theorem of the
Maximum, both To(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are continuous. Let us see that Ti(F × F ) ⊆ F , for
i = o, r, b. Let (fo, fr) ∈ F × F . By the definition of Tb as the maximum of a convex combination
of fo and fr, it is clear that Tb(fo, fr) ≥ n1−β . Also,
To(fo, fr)(a) ≥ max
c,a′
u(c, ~)+β n1− β ≥ u
(
w + a+ (1− δ)p
R
, ~
)
+β n1− β ≥ n+β
n
1− β =
n
1− β ,
(B.14)
and
Tr(fo, fr)(a) ≥ max
c,a′
u(c, ~)+β n1− β ≥ u(w−rh+a, hr)+β
n
1− β ≥ n+β
n
1− β =
n
1− β . (B.15)
On the other hand,
Tb(fo, fr)(a) ≤ mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) ≤ mbvj + (1−mb)vj = vj (B.16)
and Tb(fo, fr)(a) ≤ fr(a) ≤ vj , for all a ∈ [a, aj ], for all j = 0, 1, . . .. Hence, given that for any
a ∈ [a, aj ], D(a) ⊆ [a, aj+1] by the definition of vj , we have
To(fo, fr)(a) ≤ uj + βvj+1 = vj , for all a ∈ [a, aj ]. (B.17)
By a similar computation, To(fo, fr)(a) ≤ vj for all a ∈ [a, aj ]. It thus follows that Ti(F ×F ) ⊆ F ,
for all i = o, r, b. Consider now C(A) with the topology generated by the countable family of
seminorms ‖f‖j = maxa∈[a,aj ] |f(a)|, for all j = 0, 1, . . .. This family is separated (‖f‖j = 0 for all
j implies that f is the null function). Since the compact intervals [a, aj ] form an increasing family
that covers A and they have nonempty interiors, the space C(A) is complete with this topology
(see Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero, 2003). Consider the product space E = F ×F with
the seminorms ‖(fo, fr)‖j = max{‖fo‖j , ‖fr‖j}, for j = 0, 1, . . . and (fo, fr) ∈ E. It is clear that E
is complete with this topology, and that the set E is closed. Consider the series ∑∞j=0 c−juj , with
c > u, where u was defined in (B.11). By the ratio test and by (B.11)
lim
j→∞
c−(j+1)uj+1
c−juj
= u
c
< 1, (B.18)
so the series converges. Moreover, since β u < 1, it is possible to choose c > u with β c < 1.
Following Theorem 4 in Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003), T = (To, Tr) is a local
contraction on F ×F , so T admits a unique fixed point in F ×F , that is, there are unique Wo ∈ F ,
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Wr ∈ F such that To(Wo,Wr) = Wo and Tr(Wo,Wr) = Wr. Also, Tb(Wo,Wr) = Wb is the buyer’s
value function.
To prove that Wo and Wr are strictly increasing, let a1 < a2. Then D(a1) ⊆ D(a2), since pˆ,
as the composition of two decreasing functions, is increasing. Let (fo, fr) ∈ E × E, where both fo
and fr are non decreasing. Then mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) is non decreasing in
a, since 0 ≤ mb < 1. Hence,
max
mb∈D(a1)
{
mb fo (a1 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a1)
}
≤ max
mb∈D(a1)
{
mb fo (a2 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a2)
}
≤ max
mb∈D(a2)
{
mb fo (a2 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a2)
}
.
It follows that Tb(fo, fr) is continuous and, being the maximum of two non decreasing functions, it
is also non decreasing. Plugging this result into the definitions of To and Tr, we get, by the same
reasoning, that both Tb(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are non decreasing, since the feasible correspondence
of both problems is increasing in a. Actually, both Tb(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are strictly increasing,
since the utility function u(w+a−a′/R, h) is increasing with respect to a, for h ∈ {hr, ~}. Finally,
the subset of F of non decreasing functions is closed in F , so the fixed points Wo, Wr and Wb are
non decreasing. However, in the case of Wo and Wr, they are increasing by the previous argument,
as they satisfy To(Wo,Wr) = Wo and Tb(Wo,Wr) = Wb, respectively.
It is direct to show that the general theorem above applies, among others, to the utility functions
used in the calibration of the model.
Corollary 2. The conclusions of Theorem 1 hold under the same hypotheses, in the following cases.
1. u(c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + v(h), with σ > 1.
2. u(c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + v(h), with σ ≤ 1 and R
1−σβ < 1,
where v(h) < v(~). Note that σ = 1 corresponds to u(c, h) = log(c) + v(h).
Proof. We only need to show that (B.11) holds. Note that u(·, h) is increasing in cases 1 and 2.
When σ > 1, u is negative and bounded. The sequence {uj}, being increasing and bounded, then
converges and u = 1 < 1β . When σ < 1, u is positive but unbounded. In fact,
uoj = u
(
w + aj +
(1− δ)p
R
, ~
)
. (B.19)
Given the definition of aj , it is direct to see that
lim
j→∞
uoj+1
uoj
= lim
j→∞
φ
(
w + aj+1 + (1−δ)pR
)1−σ
+ v(~)
φ
(
w + aj + (1−δ)pR
)1−σ
+ v(~)
= R1−σ. (B.20)
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In the logarithmic case, where σ = 1, uoj is bounded by
∣∣∣log (w + aj + (1−δ)pR )∣∣∣ + |v(~)| for large
enough j. The ratio
| log (w + aj+1 + (1−δ)pR )|+ |v(~)|
| log (w + aj + (1−δ)pR )|+ |v(~)
(B.21)
tends to 1 as j →∞, so (B.11) is satisfied. A similar computation holds for urj .
C Differentiability, Euler equations and concavity
In this section we prove the differentiability of the value functions along the optimal paths. This
suffices to obtain the Euler equations; differentiability in the entire domain is not required. Other
approaches to prove differentiability of the value function in a non-concave framework are due to
Dechert and Nishimura (1983), Milgrom and Segal (2002), or Clausen and Strub (2016)), but do not
apply to our setting (for the same reasons they do not apply to the model of Menzio et al. (2013)).
Thanks to the results that we introduce in this section, we do not need to introduce lotteries but
work directly within the non concave framework. We show that the Euler equations still hold as
necessary conditions of optimality, so they can be used to compute the optimal policies. We are
also able to establish a link between the concavity of the value functions and the monotonicity of
the optimal consumption policies. Our results are based on the approach recently introduced in
Rincón-Zapatero (2020). However, this approach does no apply directly to the Bellman equations
satisfied by Wo, Wr and Wb, due to their particular structure, so we need to elaborate a bit more.
We introduce the concepts of Fréchet super– and subdifferentials of a function (F-superdifferential
and F-subdifferential, henceforth) to simplify the presentation and the proofs that follow. For a
continuous function f : Ω ⊆ Rn → R, where Ω is an open set, the vector p ∈ Rn belongs to
the F-superdifferential of f at x0 ∈ Ω, D+f(x0), if and only if there exists a continuous function
ϕ : Ω −→ R which is differentiable at x0 with Dϕ(x0) = p, f(x0) = ϕ(x0) and f − ϕ has a local
maximum at x0. Similarly, p ∈ Rn belongs to the F-subdifferential of f at x0 ∈ Ω, D−f(x0), if and
only if there exists a continuous function ϕ : Ω −→ R which is differentiable at x0 with Dϕ(x0) = p,
f(x0) = ϕ(x0) and f−ϕ has a local minimum at x0. D+f(x0) and D−f(x0) are closed convex (and
possible empty) subsets ofRn. Yet, if f is differentiable at x0, then both D+f(x0) and D−f(x0) are
nonempty and D+f(x0) = D−f(x0) = {Df(x0)}. Reciprocally, if for a function f , both D+f(x0)
and D−f(x0) are nonempty, then f is differentiable at x0 and D+f(x0) = D−f(x0) = {Df(x0)},
where Df denotes the derivative of f . Given two continuous functions f1 and f2, two nonnegative
numbers λ1 and λ2 and pi ∈ D+fi(x), for i = 1, 2, λ1p1 + λ2p2 ∈ D+(λ1f1 + λ2f2)(a). A simi-
lar proposition holds for D−. Another property that we will use is that, whenever x0 is a local
maximum of f in Ω, 0 ∈ D+f(x0). Finally, D+f(x0) 6= ∅ if the function f is concave. See, for
instance, Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (1997) for these and for other properties of the F-super– and
subdifferentials of a function.
The next theorem characterizes the F-differentials of the value function f(x) = maxy∈Γ(x) F (x, y),
where F : X × Y → R is continuous, with X,Y ⊆ Rn, and where Γ is a correspondence from X
to Y is nonempty, compact valued and continuous. The result is well known in the case in which
the correspondence Γ is constant (i.e., when Γ(x) = Y for all x ∈ X), but for the general case it is
a generalization of the Benveniste-Scheinkman envelope argument. We will apply the theorem to
show the validity of the Euler equations in our model, which is a non-trivial issue due to the lack
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of concavity.
Theorem 3. Consider the problem described above, f(x) = maxy∈Γ(x) F (x, y). Let x0 be an interior
point of X and y0 ∈ Γ(x0) satisfying: (i) f(x0) = F (x0, y0), and (ii) there is a ball B(x0, ε) in X
with center x0 and radius ε > 0, such that for all x ∈ B(x0, ε), y0 ∈ Γ(x). Then D−x F (x0, y0) ⊆
D−f(x0) and D+f(x0) ⊆ D+x F (x0, y0), where D±x F (x0, y0) denotes the F–upper/lower differential
of the function x 7→ F (x, y0).
Proof. By Bergé’s Theorem, f is continuous and the optimal policy correspondence is nonempty.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that the function x 7→ f(x) − F (x, y0) is well defined on the ball
B(x0, ε) and attains a local minimum at x0. If D−x F (x0, y0) is empty, then there is nothing to
prove. Suppose that it is nonempty. Let ϕ be continuous in B(x0, ε) and differentiable at x0 such
that F (x, y0) − ϕ(x) has a local minimum at x0 and F (x0, y0) = ϕ(x0). Then f(x) − ϕ(x) ≥
F (x, y0)−ϕ(x) ≥ 0 and f(x0)−ϕ(x0) = F (x0, y0)−ϕ(x0) = 0 by (i). Thus x0 is a local minimum
of f −ϕ, and so Dϕ(x0) ∈ D−f(x0). Now, if D+f(x0) = ∅ then D+f(x0) ⊆ D+x F (x0, y0), trivially.
If D+f(x0) 6= ∅, let ϕ be continuous in B(x0, ε) such that Dϕ(x0) ∈ D+f(x0) and f − ϕ has
a local maximum at x0, with (f − ϕ)(x0) = 0. Then F (x, y0) − ϕ(x) ≤ f(x) − ϕ(x) ≤ 0 =
F (x0, y0) − ϕ(x0), for all x ∈ B(x0, ε). Hence, x0 is a maximum of x 7→ F (x, y0) − ϕ(x), and so
Dϕ(x0) ∈ D+x F (x0, y0).
Remark 4. Note that (ii) is satisfied when (x0, y0) is an interior point of the graph of Γ, although
it may be fulfilled more generally, as we will show in our housing model. On the other hand,
D−x F (x0, y0) 6= ∅ implies D−x f(x0) 6= ∅. Hence, if f is concave then f is differentiable. This is the
classical envelope theorem of dynamic programming.
After this preliminary exposition, we turn to our specific problem, given by (B.1)–(B.3). In the
results that follow, we will assume that there are selections of gao , gar and gθb such that gao and gar
are interior, and
0 ≤ gθ(a) < p−1
(
a
1 + τb
)
, (C.1)
for all a ∈ A. Hence, we do not assume uniqueness of the optimal policies.
Define amin = (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ) p. This is the threshold value of a above which D(a), as
defined in (B.4), is nonempty. Denote by apart > amin the maximum a > amin such that gθ(a) = θ0
for amin < a ≤ apart (if it exists).
Our strategy for proving that the value functions are differentiable at the optimal policies
consists on showing that both the F-subdifferential and the F-superdifferential are nonempty along
the optimal paths. This is the content of the results that follow. As a byproduct, we prove that
the Euler equations hold. We use this result in our computation (see Section E.3).
Lemma 5. Let a0 > a. Then (i) uc(gco(a0), ~) ∈ D−Wo(a0), and (ii) uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ D−Wr(a0).
Proof. We only prove (i), since the proof of (ii) is similar. Wo satisfies the Bellman equation (B.1).
Since gao (a0) is interior, given that the feasible correspondence is a closed interval, there is an open
interval I centered at a0, such that gao (a) ∈ (−(1− δ)p,R(w+ a)) for all a ∈ I. Thus (i) and (ii) in
Theorem 3 hold. Moreover, taking α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ), the function
F (a, gao (a0)) = u (w + a− gao (a0)/R, ~) + β αWo (gao (a0)) + β (1− α) Wb (gao (a0) + p) ,
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is differentiable with respect to a, with derivative uc(gco(a0), ~) at a = a0, as the second and
third summands in the definition of F are constant. Theorem 3 then implies uc(gco(a0), ~) ∈
D−Wo(a0).
To explore whether D−Wb is nonempty, we rewrite the problem of a potential buyer in an
equivalent form. Let
W (a,mb) =
{
Wr(a), if a ≤ amin, mb ∈ [0, 1],
mb (Wo(a− (1 + τb)pˆ(mb))−Wr(a)) +Wr(a), if a > amin, mb ∈ D(a), (C.2)
where D(a) is defined in (B.7). Let D˜(a) = {0} for a ≤ amin, and D˜(a) = D(a) for a > amin. The
correspondence D˜ is nonempty, compact valued and continuous. Formally, we are identifying the
choice θ0 in the original problem with mb = 0. Given this, it is clear that the original problem is
equivalent to the new formulation: maxW (a,mb) subject to mb ∈ D˜(a). Note that W is piecewise
continuous and, when restricted to the graph of D˜, it is continuous. For, if (an, (mb)n) is a pair
of sequences converging to (amin,mb) along the graph of D˜, where mb ∈ [0, 1], then for an > amin,
(mb)n = p̂−1(an)→ p̂−1(amin) = 0, and for an < amin, (mb)n = 0. Hence,
W (an, (mb)n)→ 0(Wo(0)−Wr(amin)) +Wr(amin) = Wr(amin) = W (amin, 0), (C.3)
as n→∞. Since mb = 0 is feasible for any a and gθb (a) = 0 in the region a ≤ apart (if apart exists),
Wb(a) = Wr(a) in this region.
Lemma 6. Let a0 > a. Then D−Wb(a0) = D−Wr(a0), for a0 ≤ apart, and
mb
(
gθb (a0)
)
po +
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a0)
))
pr ∈ D−Wb(a0), (C.4)
for a0 > apart, where po = uc
(
gco(a0 − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a0))), ~
)
and pr = uc(gcr(a0), hr).
Proof. For a < a < apart,Wb(a) = Wr(a), so (i) is trivial. At a = apart, mb = 0 is the optimal choice
(it is the only feasible choice, given our reformulation of the problem). Although not interior to the
graph of D˜(a), this choice satisfies condition (ii) in Lemma 3, that is, 0 ∈ D˜(a) in a neighborhood
of apart (for all a, actually). Hence, D−Wb(apart) 6= ∅. Let a0 > apart. Since gθb is interior, the
optimal gmb(a0) is interior. Thus the function of a
F (a, gmb(a0)) = gmb(a0)Wo(a− (1 + τb)pˆ(gmb(a0))) + (1− gmb(a0))Wr(a)) (C.5)
is well defined in a suitable interval centered at a0. Moreover, D−a F (a0, gmb(a0)) 6= ∅. To see this,
take po ∈ D−Wo (a0 − (1 + τb) pˆ(gmb(a0))) and pr ∈ D−Wr(a0), which exist by Lemma 5. By one of
the properties mentioned just above Theorem 3, gmb(a0) po + (1− gmb(a0)) pr ∈ D−a F (a0, gmb(a0)),
or, equivalently,
mb
(
gθb (a0)
)
po +
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a0)
))
pr ∈ D−a F (a0, gθb (a0)), (C.6)
with po and pr as described in the statement of the lemma. Since D−a F (a0, gθb (a0)) ⊆ D−Wb(a0)
by Theorem 3, the result in the lemma holds.
The fact that the F-subdifferential of the value function is nonempty is not enough to get
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differentiability, since the value functions need not be concave. Below we follow the path initiated
in Rincón-Zapatero (2020) to prove differentiability in the absence of concavity, which uses the
optimality condition and the special structure of the Bellman equation. This will provide us with
conditions for the nonemptiness of the F-superdifferential of the value functions at the optimal
policies.
Lemma 7. Let a0 > a. Then uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ RβD+Wb(gar (a0)).
Proof. Consider the Bellman equation (B.2) and the function of a′ given by
F (a0, a′) := u(w − rh + a0 − a′/R, hr) + βWb(a′). (C.7)
Since gar (a0) is an interior optimum to the Bellman equation (B.2), 0 ∈ D+a′F (a0, gar (a0)). But, since
u is of class C1, D+a′F = {−uc/R}+ βD+Wb. Hence, −uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ RβD+Wb(gar (a0)).
Our next result shows that Wb is differentiable at the renter’s optimal policy, and establishes
the validity of the renter’s Euler equation.
Proposition 8. Let a > a. Then
(i) Wb is differentiable at gar (a);
(ii) the Euler equation
− uc(gcr(a), hr)
+Rβ
[
mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
+
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a′)
))
uc(gcr(a′), hr)
]
= 0
holds, where a′ = gar (a).
Proof. By Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, both the F-super– and the F-subdifferential ofWb are nonempty
at gar (a). Hence,Wb is differentiable at gar (a). The derivative is, on the one hand, the unique element
in D−Wb(gar (a)), that is, W ′b(gar (a)) = 1Rβuc(gcr(a), hr) and, on the other hand, the unique element
in D+Wb(gar (a)), that is
W ′b(gar (a)) = uc(gcr(a′), hr), (C.8)
for gar (a) ≤ apart, and
W ′b(gar (a)) = mb
(
gθb (a′)
) [
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
−uc(gcr(a′), hr)
]
+uc(gcr(a′), hr), (C.9)
for gar (a) > apart, where a′ = gar (a) in both (C.8) and (C.9). Since mb
(
gθb (apart)
)
= 0, (C.9)
encompasses (C.8). Equating 1Rβuc(gcr(a), hr) to (C.9), we obtain the renter’s Euler equation.
Proposition 9. Let a > apart. Then
(i) Wo is differentiable at gao (a);
(ii) the Euler equation
−uc(gco(a), ~) +Rβαuc(gcr(a′), ~) +Rβ(1− α)mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
+Rβ(1− α) (1−mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
)uc(gcr(a′), hr) = 0,
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holds, where a′ = gao (a) + p and α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ).
Proof. From (B.1), the function of a′
F (a, a′) = u(w + a− a′/R, ~) + β αWo
(
a′
)
+ β(1− α)Wb
(
a′ + p
)
(C.10)
satisfies 0 ∈ D+a′F (a, gao (a)). Since both u and Wb are differentiable,
−uc(gco(a), ~) +Rβ (1− α)W ′b(gao (a) + p) ∈ −Rβ αD+Wo(gao (a)),
so D+Wo is nonempty at gao (a). This, combined with Lemma 5, implies that Wo is differentiable
at gao (a0). Also, its derivative at this point is given, on the one hand, by uc(gco(a), ~), and, on the
other hand, by 1Rβαuc(gco(gao (a)), ~)− (1−α)α W ′b(gao (a)+p). Equating both expressions, and replacing
W ′b(gar (a)) by its value in (C.9), we obtain the Euler equation in (ii).
Now we study concavity. Concavity of the value functions is proved in intervals where the
optimal consumption policy of the renters is nondecreasing.
Proposition 10. Wb is concave in intervals I of the image of gar if and only if gcr is nondecreasing
in the preimage of this subset, (gar )−1(I).
Proof. Note that Wb is differentiable in I by Proposition 9. Also, if a′ ∈ I, there is a > a such
that a′ = gar (a) and W ′b(a′) = uc(gcr(θ), hr)/R by Lemma 5. Let a′i ∈ I and let ai > a such that
a′i = gar (ai), for i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that a′1 > a′2. By the Mean Value
Theorem,
Wb(a′1)−Wb(a′2) = W ′b(θ′)(a′1 − a′2) =
1
R
uc(gcr(θ), hr)(a′1 − a′2), (C.11)
where a′2 < θ′ < a′1 and where θ′ = gar (θ). Since gar is nondecreasing, a2 < θ < a1, and since gcr is non
decreasing, gcr(a2) ≤ gcr(θ) ≤ gcr(a1). Now, u(·, hr) is concave, so uc(gcr(θ), hr) ≤ uc(gcr(a2), hr) =
RW ′b(a′2). Hence,
Wb(a′1)−Wb(a′2) ≤W ′b(a′2)(a′1 − a′2), (C.12)
and so Wb is concave in C. Obviously, the reasoning above is reversible.
Proposition 11. Let I be an interval of A such that gar (I) is an interval. Then Wr is strictly
concave in I if and only if gcr is nondecreasing in I.
Proof. Let a1, a2 ∈ I and let λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Since gar (I) is convex, λ1a1 + λ2a2 ∈ I, λ1gar (a1) +
λ2gar (a2) ∈ gar (I). Also, (λ1a1 + λ2a2, λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2)) belongs to the graph of the buyer’s
feasible correspondence, since it is convex. Moreover, Wb is concave in gar (I) by Proposition 10.
Then
Wr(λ1a1 + λ2a2) ≤ u(λ1a1 + λ2a2, λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2), hr) + βWb(λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2))
≤ λ1u(a1, gar (a1), hr) + λ2u(a2, gar (a2), hr) + βλ1Wb(gar (a1)) + βλ1Wb(gar (a1))
= λ1Wr(a1) + λ2Wr(a2),
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where we have used the fact that u is concave and Wb is concave in the image of gar . Hence, Wr is
concave in I. Strict concavity of Wr follows from strict concavity of u.
Proposition 12. Let I be an interval of A such that both gao (I) and gar (I) are intervals and
{p}+ gao (I) ⊆ gar (I). Then Wo is strictly concave in I
Proof. We use the fact that the restriction of the operator To to the set F is a contraction. This
restricted operator is defined in the obvious way. First, fix the buyer’s value function Wb which,
given the hypotheses of the proposition and Proposition 10, is concave in gar (I). The restricted
operator is then
T bo (fo)(a) = max
c,a′
{
U b(c, ~) + βαfo(a′)
}
, (C.13)
where U b(c, a′) = u(c, ~)+β(1−α)Wb(a′+p) is strictly concave, and α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ). Hence,
if fo is concave, T bofo is concave. By Stokey-Lucas-Prescott, the limit of the iterating sequence (T bo )n
is concave and thus Wo is concave. Once this is proved, the dynamic programming equation in
(C.13) implies that Wo is in fact strictly concave, since Ub strictly concave.
D Proofs of Propositions 1 to 3
The characterization results in Section 3.3 follow from the properties of the value functions estab-
lished in Sections B and C. Potential buyers solve problem (B.8), or, equivalently, the problem
described right after Lemma 5. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, an optimal solution to this
problem exists, by the Theorem of the Maximum. Since the price function pˆ in (B.6) is strictly
increasing and strictly convex, the concavity result in Proposition 12 implies that, conditional on
participating in the afternoon market, the optimal solution is unique under the assumptions in
Proposition 1. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the associated policy function is contin-
uous. This proves Proposition 1. Proposition 2 then follows from the differentiability Wo and the
concavity result in Proposition 12.
Proof. SinceWo is differentiable (Proposition 9), the optimal solution of buyers who find it optimal
to participate in the afternoon market is characterized by the first-order condition:
[Wo (a− (1 + τ)pˆ(mb))−Wr(a)]−mb (1 + τb) pˆ′(mb)W ′o (a− (1 + τb)pˆ(mb))
= λˆ(a) (1 + τb) pˆ′(mb), (D.1)
where λˆ(a) is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint in (B.7). The result is trivial if
λ(a) > 0. If λ(a) = 0, (D.1) can be written as:( 1
1 + τb
)(
Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a)
mbW ′o (a− (1 + τb) p)
)
= pˆ′(mb). (D.2)
This equation has a unique solution (Proposition 1). The term in the left-hand side is the buyer’s
marginal rate of substitution of p formb. Buyers prefer high values ofmb and low values of p. Given
the assumption on gcr(a), Wo is strictly concave, by Proposition 12. If (Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a))
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increases with a for a given p, this implies that the buyer’s marginal rate of substitution is strictly
increasing in a and, hence, so is the optimal value of mb.
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the original problem where potential buyers choose θ.
The result follows from the continuity and differentiability of Wb and Wr, and Proposition 1.
Proof. Let W˜b(a) denote the value of a potential buyer conditional on participating in the afternoon
market, that is, the value of problem (3.2). Let g˜θb (a) be the associated policy function. Then
Wb(a) = max{W˜b(a),Wr(a)}, (D.3)
and g˜θb (a) = gθb (a) if Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a). Since θ0 is only feasible choice for a potential buyer
when a ≤ amin = (1 + τb) pmin − (1− δ) p, Wb(a) = Wr(a) on this range. Suppose a > amin, so the
constraint set of problem (3.2) is nonempty. Applying the Envelope theorem to the Lagrangian of
this problem yields
W˜ ′b(a)−W ′r(a) = mb
(
g˜θb (a)
) (
W ′o
(
a− (1 + τb) p(g˜θb (a))
)
−W ′r(a)
)
+ λ(a). (D.4)
The righthand side of (D.4) is strictly positive because mb(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ R+, the term
in brackets is strictly positive by assumption, and λ(a) ≥ 0. Thus W˜b(a) − Wr(a) is strictly
increasing for a > amin. By assumption, Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a) for some a. Since W˜b and Wr
are continuous, there then exists apart such that Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a) for all a > apart and
Wb(apart) = W˜b(apart) = Wr(apart). Since p(gθb (a)) > pmin for a > apart, p(θ) is continuous, and so
is gθb (a) on this range (by Proposition 1), p(lima→a+part g
θ
b (apart)) > pmin. Thus apart > amin and, by
continuity, this inequality also holds for any a < a0 sufficiently close to apart. Since W˜b(a)−Wr(a) is
strictly increasing on this range,Wb(a) = Wr(a) > W˜b(a) and so gθb (a) = {θ0} for any a < apart.
Finally, when the borrowing constraint holds for some buyers and is slack for others, the exis-
tence of the threshold a1 follows directly from the following result, which uses the differentiability
of Wo and Wr and the strict monotonicity of Wr.
Lemma 13. If a < a′ and λˆ(a), λˆ(a′) > 0 then λˆ(a′) < λˆ(a).
Proof. If λˆ(a) > 0, the price paid by a buyer with assets a is a+(1−δ)p(1+τb) . Thus (D.1) implies
λˆ(a) = Wo (−(1− δ) p)−Wr(a)(1 + τb)pˆ′(mb) −mbW
′
o (−(1− δ)p)
= Wo (−(1− δ) p)−Wr(a)(1 + τb)pˆ′(mb) −mb uc (g
c
o (−(1− δ) p) , ~) , (D.5)
where the last equality follows from the Envelope theorem. Also, since pˆ(mb) is given by (B.6), mb
satisfies
κs + (1− β)p
mˆs(mb)
+ βp = a+ (1− δ)p(1 + τb) . (D.6)
If assets increase from a to a′ then mb increases, since mˆs is strictly decreasing, and so does pˆ′(mb),
since pˆ is strictly increasing and strictly convex. SinceWr is strictly increasing by Theorem 1, (D.5)
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then implies λˆ(a′) < λˆ(a).
E Computation
In order to compute a stationary equilibrium it is best to rewrite the problems of potential buyers
and intermediaries so that, instead of choosing mb taking pˆ(mb) as given, they choose p taking as
given the inverse of the increasing function pˆ(mb), which we denote by mb(p). For this, it is crucial
that mb(θ) is a function instead of a correspondence. In particular, we cannot use the standard
“truncated” Cobb-Douglas matching function. In our calibration, we use the class of matching
functions in Chaumont and Shi (2018) (though the urn-ball matching function could also be used).
E.1 The matching function and the equilibrium price schedule
Given the Walrasian price p, equation (B.6) determines ms as a function of p:
ms(p) =
κs + (1− β) p
p− β p . (E.1)
This function is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with ms(pmin) = 1 and limp→∞ms(p) = 0,
and does not depend on the choice of the matching technology.
We take ms(θ) = (1 + θ−γ)
−1
γ with γ > 0, and mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ. Thus mˆs(mb) =
(
1−mγb
)1/γ ,
and we can write
mb(p) = (1−ms(p)γ)1/γ , (E.2)
θ(p) = ms(p)
(1−ms(p)γ)1/γ
. (E.3)
Here, θ(p) is the inverse of p(θ), so it is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with limp→∞ θ(p) = 0
and limp→pmin θ(p) =∞. Also, mb(p) is strictly increasing with mb(pmin) = 0 and limp→∞mb(p) =
1. As shown in Appendix B,mb(p) is strictly concave provided −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is non decreasing.
This last assumption can be further relaxed. For instance, for the value of γ used in our calibration
to match the value of median TTB in the data (and, in fact, for any γ < 1), the assumption only
holds for values ofmb above some threshold. Yet we only require that it holds for the range of values
of mb which correspond the submarkets that are active in equilibrium (since eliminating inactive
submarkets does not change the problem of a potential buyer). One can easily verify that it suffices
to check that the slope of −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is positive for the lowest value of mb observed in
equilibrium (which corresponds to the optimal choice of a marginal buyer). If so, mb(p) is strictly
concave on the range of prices which correspond to the set of active submarkets, and the results in
Propositions 1 to 3 again hold.
E.2 The optimal choice of potential buyers
In order to extend the method in Fella (2014) to our framework, we proceed in two steps. The
problem of those potential buyers who participate in the afternoon market in equilibrium can be
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written as
Wb(a) maxp {Wr(a) +mb(p) [Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a)] }
s. t. pmin ≤ p ≤ a+(1−δ) p(1+τb) ,
(E.4)
with associated policy function gp(a). By Proposition 3, the constraint p ≥ pmin does not bind.
The buyer’s gains from trading at price p > pmin are S(a, p) = Wo (a− (1 + τ)p)−Wr(a).
By Theorem 1, S(a, p) is strictly decreasing in p. Hence, if S(a, pmin) ≤ 0 then S(a, p) < 0
for all p > pmin, and non-participation is optimal in this case. Suppose that S(a, pmin) > 0,
so the gains from participation are positive. It is direct to check from the first-order condition
of problem (E.4) that the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint is given by λ(a) =
m′b(p)[S(a, p)−S˜(a, p)], where S˜(a, p) = mb(p)m′
b
(p)uc (g
c
o (a− (1 + τb) p) , ~) (1+τb). Hence, at an optimal
solution, S(a, p) ≥ S˜(a, p), with equality if the constraint does not bind. By the Envelope Theorem,
W ′o = u′ (gco (a− (1 + τb) p)) (a− (1 + τb) p), so gco(a) is non-decreasing if Wo is concave, since u is
strictly concave. Since mb is strictly increasing and strictly concave, this implies that S˜(a, p) is
strictly increasing in p and non-increasing in a. Also, S˜ (a, pmin) = 0 regardless of the value of
a, since mb (pmin) /m′b (pmin) = 0. There is then a unique value p which solves S(a, p) = S˜(a, p)
(in line with Proposition 1), and for this value S(a, p) > 0. There are then two cases: (i) if
p ≤ (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb) then gp(a) = p, and (ii) otherwise, gp(a) = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb).
We use the following algorithm to find gp(a). Given the value functions Wo, Wr and the policy
function gco:
1. Check that S (a, pmin) > 0, so the agent’s gains from participation are positive. (Otherwise,
gθ(a) = θ0).
2. Find the maximum price the agent is willing to pay. This is equal to pr = p˜ where S (a, p˜) = 0
if p˜ ≤ (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb). Otherwise, pr = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb).
3. If S˜ (a, pr) > S (a, pr) use any solver to find a price p ∈ (pmin, pr) for which S˜ (a, p) = S (a, p).
4. If S˜ (a, pr) ≤ S (a, pr), set p = pr.
If S(a, p) is increasing in a, as in our quantitative model, the above arguments imply that both pr
and gp(a) increase with a (in line with Proposition 2). Agents with low assets are constrained and
choose p = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb). Wealthier agents are unconstrained.
E.3 The choice of financial assets
Let us focus on the problem solved by the renter at night. The expression for the Euler equation of
the problem depends on whether the agent can participate in the competitive search market in the
next afternoon. Thus there are two cases. If gar (a) + (1− δ) p < (1 + τb)pmin, the Euler equation is:
−uc (gcr(a), hr) +Rβ uc
(
gcr(a′), hr
) ≤ 0, (E.5)
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with equality if a′ = gar (a) > 0. If gar (a) + (1− δ) p ≥ (1 + τb)pmin, the Euler equation becomes
−uc (gcr(a), hr)+Rβ
[
mb
(
gp(a′)
)
uc
(
gco
(
a′ − (1 + τb) gp(a′)
)
, ~
)
+
(
1−mb
(
gp(a′)
))
uc
(
gcr
(
a′
)
, hr
)]
+ Rβ m
′
b (gp(a′))
1 + τb
[
S
(
a′, gp(a′)
)− S˜ (a′, gp(a′))] ≤ 0, (E.6)
with equality if a′ = gar (a) > 0. The problem solved by owners is similar, except for the fact that
they can borrow up to (1−δ) p. We build on Fella (2014) and solve for the optimal consumption rule
using a modified version of his generalized endogenous grid method. The algorithm is as follows:
1. Choose an initial guess for (W jo , W jr , gc,jo , gc,jr ). For the owner’s value function, we use the
value function of an owner that is never hit by any shock as an initial guess. For the renter,
we use that of a renter who never participates in the afternoon market. The consumption
policy function of the renter will have a discontinuity point. We choose aj = (1 + τb) pmin as
the first guess for this point.
2. Solve the afternoon problem as outlined in Section E.2 to find gp(a) and Wb(a).
3. For a given grid for next period’s assets, ga, we use the Euler equation to find consumption
today. We know that, if ga < aj , the Euler equation is (E.5); otherwise it is (E.6). We
need to interpolate to obtain the consumption policy function as a function of the grid of
assets today. We also need to be aware that there is a discontinuity at aj . This is key to use
interpolation to find the policy function of consumption (as a function of assets today). To find
the maximum in the region of assets that correspond to participation and non-participation,
respectively, we follow Fella (2014). There is a cutoff point below which the renter knows
that she will not participate in the afternoon market in next period. Save the node as aj+1.
Save W j+1o , W j+1r , gc,j+1o , gc,j+1r .
4. Go to step 2. Iterate until convergence.
A grid of 400 points in financial assets gives very high accuracy and is very fast.
E.4 The stationary distribution
We cannot use Monte Carlo simulations in this setup because of the curse of dimensionality. Monte
Carlo simulations are a good approximation of the invariant distribution when we are certain that
the law of large numbers holds across simulations. This is not the case here, however, because the
taste and moving idiosyncratic shocks only occur when the agent is an owner, and tenure depends
on a choice. In our economy, any change in the distribution of financial assets implies a change in
the number of submarkets which are active in equilibrium. Using Monte Carlo simulations would
require using a sample so large that the law of large numbers holds in each possible submarket,
which is computationally unfeasible.
We thus solve for the stationary distribution as in Huggett (1993) and as explained in Ríos-Rull
(1997). We use a much finer grid than the one used to solve the household’s problem (800 points
in our case) and guess the distribution of owners and renters at night. Then we use the policy
functions for financial assets to integrate numerically and find the distribution of non-traders and
potential buyers in the afternoon as shown in equations (A.1)–(A.4). We iterate until convergence.
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E.5 The algorithm to find the stationary equilibrium
1. Choose an initial guess for the Walrasian price p and obtain the price function in (E.2).
2. Solve the household’s afternoon problem as stated in Subsection E.3.
3. Find the invariant distribution. Calculate the mass N of non traders in the afternoon.
4. Given the stationary distribution of buyers, use (2.11) to calculate the density of buyers for
each level of financial assets, b(a). For the buyers who participate, use gp(a) to calculate the
probabilities of selling and buying, and thus
θ˜(a) = ms (g
p(a))
mb (gp(a))
. (E.7)
5. Find the amount of vacant homes needed to satisfy the rational expectations condition at the
guessed prices:
S′ =
∫
A
b(a)
θ˜(a)
da. (E.8)
6. Compare S′ with the actual number of vacant homes, H −N . If S′ > H −N (the price p is
too low), update p upwards. If S′ < H −N , update p downwards. Go back to step 1.
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(c) Positive sorting.
Figure 1: The choice of submarket.
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(a) The price policy function gp(a) (b) Probability of buying as a function of financial
assets mb (gp(a))
(c) The renter’s consumption policy function gcr(a) (d) The renter’s value function Wr(a)
Figure 2: Policy functions
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Prices and TTB as a function of financial assets for different values of δ.
Table 1: Calibration
Param. Observation Value
w Monthly wage 1000.0000
r (annually) Díaz & Luengo-Prado (IER 2010) 0.0391
rh AHS, median housing costs renters 28% of income 0.25w
τb Indirect taxes on buyers 0.0250
τs Indirect taxes on owners 0.0600
κs Cost of posting a vacancy 0.0000
δ SCF, median LTV ratio = 41.04% 0.5000
piµ NAR: Median tenure of 10 years 0.0059
piξo Annual mobility of owners = 3.2 % 0.0025
piξr Annual mobility of renters = 12 % 0.0100
σ Risk aversion parameter 2.0000
hr/~ Homeownership rate = 69.43% 0.9992
β Median W/E for renters = 0.3450 0.8480
γ Median TTB (NAR) [10 12] 0.6552
H/N (%) Median H/E for owners = 2.7223 70.6447
Notes: The model period is a month. Annualized values. The monthly wage w is the
numeraire and has been set w = 1000.
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Table 2: The benchmark steady state
Target Source Data Bench. Walras
p/(12w) - - 2.6500 1.0070
Homeownership rate SCF mean1989-2007 69.4258 69.6940 70.6447
Median H/E owners SCF median 1989-2007 2.7223 2.7039 1.0070
Median LTV ratio (%) " 41.0448 38.6170 42.3390
Median W/E renters " 0.3450 0.2933 0.5274
Median TTB NAR 2017 [10-12] 11.5470 168.8001
Rent-to-Price ratio (%) Sommer and Sullivan (2018) [8-15] 9.4338 24.8261
Median TOM NAR 2017 [4-17] 10.1940 0.0000
Months of Supply NAR 2017 5.4737 2.6204 1.0000
Vacancy rate (%) AHS, mean 2011-2015 2.1766 2.1763 0.8418
Mean error (%) Lisi and Iacobini (2013) 2.3500 0.4123 0.0000
Coeff. of Variation (%) Lisi and Iacobini (2013) 2.2500 0.5152 0.0000
% of sales error > 1% Zillow 5% interval 16.3000 5.6968 0.0000
Gini of renters wealth Gr - - 0.5351 0.1956
Gini of wealth (all) G - - 0.2183 0.2016
Part. rate - - 7.2963 62.6471
Notes: Median TTB refers to median time to buy, whereas median TOM refers to time to sell.
Both statistics are reported in weeks. The rest of the statistics are reported in annual terms.
Table 3: Long run changes in the down payment
Target δ = 0.45 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.55
Fixed H Const. Benchmark Fixed H Const.
p/pbench 1.0981 1.0000 1.0000 0.9160 1.0000
H/Hbench 1.0000 1.0916 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Homeownership rate 69.7520 76.0860 69.6940 69.6450 0.0004
Median H/E owners 2.9648 2.7034 2.7039 2.4799 2.7116
Median LTV ratio 43.7330 43.5330 38.6170 33.5140 33.6090
Median W/E renters 0.3030 0.4011 0.2933 0.2839 0.0081
Rent-to-Price ratio (%) 8.5908 9.4339 9.4338 10.2980 9.4339
Median TTB 12.0520 11.6010 11.5470 11.2040 11.4860
Median TOM 9.8128 10.1310 10.1940 10.5120 10.6840
Months of Supply 2.5207 2.6057 2.6204 2.7045 2.7128
Vacancy rate (%) 2.0953 2.3626 2.1763 2.2445 0.0000
% of sales error > 1% 5.1526 5.9006 5.6968 6.1728 2.3768
Price range 1.0294 1.0311 1.0313 1.0332 1.0314
Gini of renters wealth 0.5298 0.4592 0.5351 0.5380 0.0000
Gini of wealth (all) 0.2181 0.1633 0.2183 0.2184 0.0149
Participation rate 7.6732 10.1360 7.2963 6.9999 0.0000
Marg. buyer a/(12w) 1.3823 1.2588 1.3913 1.3958 1.5238
% buyers that trade 24.8180 25.7360 26.0300 27.0700 30.2710
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